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ABSTRACT
Public health literature has long recognized the existence of
determinants of health, a set of socioeconomic conditions that affect
health risks and health outcomes across the world. The World Health
Organization defines these determinants as “forces and systems”
consisting of “factors combin[ing] together to affect the health of
individuals and communities.” Frameworks relying on determinants of
health have been widely adopted by countries in the global South and
North alike, as well as international institutional players, several of
which are direct or indirect players in transnational intellectual
property (IP) policymaking. Issues raised by the implementation of IP
policies, however, are seldom treated as an integral part of analyses
using these frameworks, even though IP bears direct effects on the
dynamics of several determinants of health, such as access to health
goods and health services.
This Article conceptualizes post-Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) IP as a contributing element to the
literature on the socioeconomic determinants of health. IP norms and
policies have long been understood as playing a role in outcomes that
closely align with determinants frameworks, but interventions inspired
by institutions relying on determinants frameworks routinely fail to
consider the role of international IP regimes. This Article explores two
consequences of this dissociation: first, it argues that TRIPsimplemented IP materially affects several determinants of health, both
at the social and economic levels; and second, it argues that IP should
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be regarded on equal footing with other canonically recognized
determinants of health. While taking steps towards the development of
an IP framework that can be articulated with, and incorporated by,
literature on the determinants of health, the Article presents three short
case studies on pharmaceutical and agricultural technologies—HIV
prophylactic drugs (Truvada); drugs and vaccines needed for epidemic
and pandemic preparedness (Ebola vaccines and COVID-19 treatments
like remdesivir); and genetically modified rice crops.
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I. IP AND THE DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES
A. The Framework for the Socioeconomic Determinants of Health
Public health-oriented scholars, policymakers, and institutions
have long recognized the existence of a series of nonclinical factors that
affect the health of populations across the globe. Known as the
determinants of health, these factors consist in a set of socioeconomic
conditions that are likely to bear a significant impact on health risks
and health outcomes.
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Work around the determinants of health is anchored in the idea
that there are profound “inequalities in health” within populations in
the same country.1 Within the United States, for instance, different
literatures have repeatedly documented disparities in morbidity and
mortality rates depending on a range of nonclinical factors that
ultimately have an impact on the quality of life and health outcomes
associated with certain populations.2 These factors include race,
ethnicity, gender, state of residency (or even zip code within a city),3
education, class,4 and income.5 Similar studies have arrived at
comparable conclusions within other countries in the Global North6

1.
Michael Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 365 LANCET
1099, 1099 (2005).
2.
See, e.g., Allan S. Noonan, Hector Eduardo Velasco-Mondragon & Fernando
A. Wagner, Improving the Health of African Americans in the USA: An Overdue
Opportunity for Social Justice, PUB. HEALTH REV., Oct. 3, 2016, at 1, 3; NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2015: WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON RACIAL
AND ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES (2015); U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES CONTINUE IN PREGNANCY-RELATED DEATHS (Sept. 5,
2019), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2019/p0905-racial-ethnic-disparities-pregna
ncy-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/33P7-FHZZ] (archived Jan. 21, 2021) (collectively
documenting race- and ethnicity-based disparities); see also Dovile Vilda Maeve Wallace,
Lauren Dyer, Emily Harville & Katherine Theall, Income Inequality and Racial
Disparities in Pregnancy-Related Mortality in the US, 9 SSM POPULATION HEALTH 1, 2
(2019) (focusing on income inequality); Keith P. Gennuso, Courtney K. Blomme, Marjory
L. Givens, Elizabeth A. Pollock & Anne M. Roubal, Deaths of Despair(ity) in Early 21st
Century America: The Rise of Mortality and Racial/Ethnic Disparities, 57 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 585, 585–91 (2019) (focusing on diseases of despair); David Hartley,
Rural Health Disparities, Population Health, and Rural Culture, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1675, 1675–78 (2004) (focusing on rural disparities). For an overview of some of the legal
and health policy problems affecting the overall functioning of the United States
healthcare system, see generally ELIZABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS
(2017).
3.
See Jay Bhatt, Your Zip Code, Your Health, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (May 16, 2018),
https://www.aha.org/news/insights-and-analysis/2018-05-16-your-zip-code-your-health
[https://perma.cc/U49R-LAYM] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); see also Could Where You Live
Influence
How
Long
You
Live?,
ROBERT
WOOD
JOHNSON
FOUND.,
https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/interactives/whereyouliveaffectshowlongyoulive.html
(last updated Jan. 2020) [https://perma.cc/U68F-RQMC] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
4.
Stephen L. Isaacs & Steven A. Schroeder, Class—The Ignored Determinant of
the Nation’s Health, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1137, 1140 (2004).
5.
Dhruv Khullar & Dave A. Chokshi, Health, Income, & Poverty: Where We Are
& What Could Help, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 4, 2018, at 1, 1–6.
6.
See, e.g., Johan P. Mackenbach, Ivana Kulhánová, Gwenn Menvielle,
Matthias Bopp, Carme Borrell, Giuseppe Costa, Patrick Deboosere, Santiago Esnaola,
Ramune Kalediene, Katalin Kovacs, Mall Leinsalu, Pekka Martikainen, Enrique
Regidor, Maica Rodriguez-Sanz, Bjørn Heine Strand, Rasmus Hoffmann, Terje A.
Eikemo, Olof Östergren & Olle Lundberg, Trends in Inequalities in Premature Mortality:
A Study of 3.2 Million Deaths in 13 European Countries, 69 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY.
HEALTH 207, 207–17 (2014); Churnrurtai Kanchanachitra & Viroj Tangcharoensathien,
Health Inequality Across Prefectures in Japan, 390 LANCET 1471, 1471–73 (2017); Gavin
Turrell, L. Stanley, Michael de Looper & Brian Frederick Oldenburg, Health Inequalities
in Australia: Morbidity, Health Behaviours, Risk Factors and Health Service Use, 2
AUST. INST. HEALTH & WELFARE, Apr. 6, 2007, at 1.
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and Global South.7 Moreover, these disparities are also detected
through comparisons between analogous populations in different
countries or geographical regions.8
An important characteristic of the global distribution of health
disparities is that they have become systemically ingrained in
economies of the Global South and the Global North alike.9 But even
though they are heterogenous in origin and kind, these inequalities
have been found to share a common trait: they are “socially
determined,” in the sense that they emerge from complex decisionmaking processes.10 The idea of social determination seeks to
emphasize the fact that lack of access to vital goods and services, such
as water or health care, is not merely attributable to the existence of
infrastructural or technical shortcomings in the status quo. Rather, it
is the product of a series of allocative decisions, often made by different
actors and at different points in time, converging towards the
ossification of structural inequalities and to the worsening of health
outcomes within certain populations.11
The concept of, and framework for, the determinants of health
thus arose against this background, and current policy interventions
relying on determinants frameworks embody this approach. The World
Health Organization (WHO), which defines the social determinants of
health as “the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and
age,”12 further notes that these conditions “are shaped by the
distribution of money, power, and resources at global, national, and
local levels. The social determinants of health are mostly responsible

7.
See, e.g., Alba Llop-Gironés, Mireia Julià, Sergio Chicumbe, Janeth Dulá,
Anita Aunda Pedro Odallah, Francesc Alvarez, Ivan Zahinos, Elisio Mazive & Joan
Benach, Inequalities in the Access to and Quality of Healthcare in Mozambique: Evidence
from the Household Budget Survey, 31 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 577, 577–82
(2019); Nandini Oomman, Elizabeth Lule, Deborah Vazirani & Ritu Chhabra,
Inequalities in Health, Nutrition and Population, WORLD BANK REP., June 2003, at 1;
Celia Landmann-Szwarcwal1 & James Macinko, A Panorama of Health Inequalities in
Brazil, 15 INT’L J. FOR EQUITY HEALTH 174 (2016). See generally Christopher Garimoi
Orach, Health Equity: Challenges in Low Income Countries, 9 AFR. HEALTH SCI. (SPECIAL
ISSUE 2) S49, S49–S51 (2009); Davidson R. Gwatkin, Trends in Health Inequalities in
Developing Countries, 5 LANCET 371 (2017).
8.
Marmot, supra note 1, at 1099; see, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., FACT FILE ON
HEALTH INEQUITIES, https://www.who.int/sdhconference/background/news/facts/en/
[https://perma.cc/E98V-8YEB] (archived Jan. 21, 2021) (noting, inter alia, a “36-year gap
in life expectancy” between Malawi and Japan).
9.
See, e.g., Ichiro Kawachi & Bruce P. Kennedy, Socioeconomic Determinants of
Health: Health And Social Cohesion: Why Care About Income Inequality?, 314 BRIT.
MED. J. 1037, 1037–40 (1997).
10. Marmot, supra note 1, at 1101.
11. See id.
12. Social Determinants of Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/
social_determinants/en/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DFJ9-3Z2B]
(archived Jan. 21, 2021).
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for health inequities—the unfair and avoidable differences in health
status seen within and between countries.”13
It is important to note that current definitions of determinants of
health are not homogenous. Several institutions distinguish between
social and economic determinants; the latter category includes factors
like income levels and income distribution—which are often recognized
as some of the most powerful predictors of health risks and outcomes.14
Several other institutions, as well as commentators and policymakers,
take a hybrid approach, speaking of socioeconomic determinants of
health.15 For instance, in addition to providing the most diffused
definition of social determinants of health,16 the WHO, in its
framework for Health Impact Assessment methods,17 describes
determinants of health as encompassing both “the social and economic
environment,” and expands the concept to include “the physical
environment,” as well as a “person’s individual characteristics and
behaviors.”18
A number of other definitional approaches coexist. To give but one
example, the U.S. Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion
distinguishes between social and physical determinants of health.19
The former group includes many conditions long recognized as social
determinants, from access to healthcare services to quality of
education and job training, as well as conditions recognized elsewhere
as economic determinants (e.g., poverty levels).20 Physical

13.
14.

Id.
See, e.g., N.Z. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. HEALTH & DISABILITY, THE SOCIAL,
CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH IN NEW ZEALAND: ACTION TO
IMPROVE HEALTH 23 (1999); see also Yannish Naik, Peter Baker, Ian Walker, Taavi
Tillmann, Kristin Bash, Darryl Quantz, Frances Hillier-Brown & Clare Bambra, The
Macro-Economic Determinants of Health and Health Inequalities—Umbrella Review
Protocol, 6 SYSTEMATIC REV. 222, 222 (2017).
15. See, e.g., Samantha Artiga & Elizabeth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role
of Social Determinants in Promoting Health and Health Equity, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
ISSUE BRIEF (May 10, 2018), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issuebrief/beyond-health-care-the-role-of-social-determinants-in-promoting-health-andhealth-equity/ [https://perma.cc/6FQ4-PTGJ] (archived May 12, 2021).
16. See Social Determinants of Health, supra note 12.
17. A Health Impact Assessment is a “combination of procedures, methods, and
tools by which a policy, program, or project may be judged as to its potential effects on
the health of a population, and the distribution of those effects within the population.”
See EUR. CTR. HEALTH POLICY, HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT (1999),
http://www.healthedpartners.org/ceu/hia/hia01/01_02_gothenburg_paper_on_hia_1999.
pdf [https://perma.cc/H3EJ-96ES] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
18. Health
Impact
Assessment,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
https://www.who.int/health-topics/health-impact-assessment#tab=tab_1 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/AW45-V389] (archived Feb. 10, 2021).
19. U.S. OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (2020), https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives/topic/social-determinants-of-health [https://perma.cc/N8VN-NCKM] (archived
Ja. 21, 2021).
20. Id.
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determinants include exposure to toxic substances, interaction with
the built environment, and consequences of climate change.21
The unifying thread in how existing definitions of determinants of
health are populated is that they are generally conceptualized as
conditions that are external to healthcare systems.22 In this sense, a
person’s income, education, or exposure to harmful chemicals may
contribute, directly or indirectly, to that person’s interaction (or lack
thereof) with a given healthcare system. These contributing factors,
however, are nonclinical in nature, even if they might create the need
for clinical interventions. Recent studies looking at premature death
rates have underlined the relevance of nonclinical factors in health
outcomes. Currently, only 10 percent of premature deaths in the
United States are linked to issues arising in the context of clinical care;
30 percent of premature deaths are attributable to genetic factors; and
60 percent are attributable to social, environmental, and behavioral
factors that fall under the general umbrella of socioeconomic
determinants of health.23
This Article uses the expression “socioeconomic determinants of
health” in an expansive way, to include all types of nonclinical
conditions that have been identified in the literature and in practice as
bearing an impact on health risks and outcomes. Moreover, as detailed
in the following Part, this Article seeks to articulate a connection
between the canonical sets of determinants of health—as currently
recognized in multiple literatures—and the impact of globally
harmonized IP frameworks and norms.
B. The Interface Between Intellectual Property and the Determinants
of Health
The impact of IP regimes on discrete fields of health-related
innovation has been studied by scholars in legal and nonlegal fields
alike. Since the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) came into force in 1995,24 commentators have
noted a progressive but inexorable convergence of national and
regional IP regimes towards higher levels of IP protection across the

21.
22.

Id.
See Jennifer Prah Ruger, Ethics of the Social Determinants of Health, 364
LANCET 1092, 1092 (2004).
23. Garth Graham & John Bernot, An Evidence-Based Path Forward to Advance
Social Determinants of Health Data, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171025.721263/full/ [https://perma.cc/
62UW-GE5Z] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
24. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
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globe.25 While this upwards harmonizing trend has been a general
feature,26 and not a specificity of the pharmaceutical and biotech
domains, the TRIPs implementation battle over IP rights covering
many of the technologies in these fields has been especially
contentious.27 As the ratcheting up of IP protection through
tendentially harmonized regimes28 has contributed to the divide
between the Global North and South,29 perhaps nowhere are
escalating levels of patent protection as noticeable as in the field of
health-related technological innovation.30
Even under globalized and globalizing IP frameworks, there is
room at the domestic level for the development of country-specific
bodies of IP law and practices. With regard to pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical technologies, lawmakers and law interpreters at
the country level have experimented with different approaches, with
varying degrees of success. India, for instance, availed itself of the
transitional period granted by TRIPs.31 Even when compelled to apply
the patent floors mandated by the Agreement, it carved out a
patentability regime for pharmaceutical innovations that is

25. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International
Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004); Ruth Okediji, Back to
Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U.
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2004); Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPs-Plus Provisions in FTAs:
Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM (Lorand
Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet,
Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play, PROGRAM ON
INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP., Oct. 1, 2010, at 1.
26. See, e.g., Denis Borges Barbosa, Minimum Standards vs. Harmonization in
the TRIPS Context: The Nature of Obligations Under TRIPS and Modes of
Implementation at the National Level in Monist and Dualist Systems, in 1 RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 52
(Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010).
27. See, e.g., Haochen Sun, The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some Reflections on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 123 (2004); Brook K. Baker,
Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding
Paragraph 6 of the DOHA Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 613 (2004).
28. But see Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, The Harmonization Myth in International
Intellectual Property Law, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 735 (2020) (challenging the centrality of
harmonization concepts and vocabulary in TRIPs implementation narratives).
29. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2832 (2006); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II:
Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 21–22 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469 (2002).
31. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous
Transformation of India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007).
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significantly less permissive of secondary patenting than most other
countries.32
However, the existence of strata of domestic patent law, lodged
amidst tendentially overprotecting national and transnational IP
regimes, is not enough to address the differentiated types of problems
created by the (mis)application of current IP laws, norms, and
philosophies to pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical innovation.
Part of the problem lies in the origins of contemporary IP. As Jerome
Reichman and Rochelle Dreyfuss have put it, “[t]he domestic patent
laws as currently practiced were largely formulated for the inventions
of the Industrial Revolution, and these laws still reflect the
technological premises and concepts of the creative sectors as they
were then structured.”33 The foundational IP treaties,34 whose ethos
and many a provision were absorbed by TRIPs,35 predate the
pharmaceutical and biotech industries, and the TRIPs-induced race to
ratchet up levels of protection has done little to account for the nuances
of innovative processes in these fields, on the one hand, and for the
very specific characteristics of the consumers of the emerging goods, on
the other. As such, individualized contemporary IP regimes may be
able to provide an ad hoc fix for a particular malfunction—as India did
with regard to secondary patenting of pharmaceuticals36—through
legislative, regulatory, or interpretive interventions. Nonetheless, they
have proven incapable of tending to systemic problems rooted in
modern embodiments of IP that render different types of drugs and
biotech products unavailable to populations in need37 or, in some cases,
that make certain drugs unavailable across the globe.38
This irresponsiveness of IP systems has a direct bearing on health
outcomes and risks faced by different populations around the globe.
Traditionally, the dynamics of IP and issues surrounding the
availability and price of pharmaceutical and biotech products have
been understood as separate from the sets of issues that make up the

32. See, e.g., Bhaven N. Sampat & Kenneth C. Shadlen, Secondary
Pharmaceutical Patenting: A Global Perspective, 46 RESEARCH POL’Y 693 (2017); see also
Ravinder Gabble & Jillian Clare Kohler, To Patent or not to Patent? The Case of Novartis’
Cancer Drug Glivec in India, GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, Jan. 6, 2014, at 693.
33. Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE
L.J. 85, 92 (2007).
34. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583.
35. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 24, §§ 2, 9.
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part II.A (case study on HIV prevention drugs in the United States).
38. See infra Part II.B (case study on drugs needed during outbreaks of infectious
diseases such as the recent Ebola and Zika epidemics and the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic).
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universe of determinants of health, at least as currently adopted for
operational purposes.
Socioeconomic
determinants
of
health
are
generally
conceptualized as “health determinants outside the health-care
system.”39 This view portrays the determinants of health as upstream
factors that may lead an individual to develop a condition that requires
clinical care, thus prompting engagement between individuals and
healthcare systems. By contrast, IP is normally associated with the
provision of goods or services—in the form of drugs or treatments—
that are made available to individuals once they engage with the
healthcare system. In this sense, not only is there a conceptual divide
between the domains of application of the determinants of health
versus IP regimes, but IP is primarily regarded as relevant at the
downstream level of healthcare provision.
As illustrated in the case studies in Part II, this separation is
artificial and does not correctly account for the on-the-ground impact
of IP laws and norms. Consider the following scenario: a company or
institution foregoes the opportunity to develop a relatively simple
vaccine or drug for a known pathogen likely to cause an outbreak; the
decision is primarily based on a prospective lack of return-oninvestment; an outbreak occurs. This sequence, which reflects what
happened recently with regard to COVID-19 drugs and Ebola
vaccines,40 has profound implications from a public health perspective,
as morbidity and mortality strain already-struggling health systems.
But it is also umbilically tied to IP paradigms, and in particular to the
incentives-providing function theorized under utilitarian IP
approaches. From this perspective, IP becomes a contributing factor
affecting health outcomes and health risks.
Although different in kind, another example of the direct impact
of IP frameworks—or, if nothing else, of IP-informed choices—in public
health outcomes and risks is provided by countless instances of
excessive pricing of pharmaceutical products, which in recent decades
has become a recurring feature of the United States drug pricing
ecosystem.41 Part of this phenomenon is enabled by the proliferation of
patents over pharmaceutical and biotech products, which can inhibit
the entrance of generic drugs and, more broadly, competition.42 For

39. Ruger, supra note 22, at 1092.
40. See infra Part II.
41. See Inmaculada Hernandez, Chester B. Good, David M. Cutler, Walid F.
Gellad, Natasha Parekh & William H. Shrank, The Contribution of New Product Entry
Versus Existing Product Inflation in the Rising Costs of Drugs, 38 HEALTH AFF. 76, 76–
83 (2019).
42. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of
Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
(Keith Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
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instance, recent studies have shown that the manufacturers of the
eight best-selling biologic drugs in the United States applied for an
average of 151 patents for each individual biologic.43 Through the
articulation of patent rights, market exclusivities granted by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration,44 and product hopping,45 sponsors of
these drugs estimate that follow-on competitors are not able to enter
the market for periods ranging from thirty-one to forty-eight years.46
Rising prices of pharmaceuticals and biologic drugs is likely not to
be restricted to the Global North, as North-South bilateral and
plurilateral agreements have become a tool for ratcheting up
pharmaceutical and biotech IP rules and policies.47 Recently, a strand
of commentary has attempted to counter this narrative by suggesting
that the proliferation of trade agreements in recent years has not
increased the prices of pharmaceuticals in developing countries.48
Kapczynski, Sampat, and Shadlen, however, have argued that there is
insufficient empirical data documenting the actual impact that trade
agreements have had on the prices of medicines across the developing
world.49
The manifold ways in which IP can have a direct bearing on access
to drugs (or other biotech products, such as fortified foods) by
populations in need have direct consequences for the health of
individuals, communities, and health systems. For example, by laying
out the legal-economic construct that allows firms to limit patients’
access to HIV drugs, post-TRIPs patent law has a direct bearing on
present and future health outcomes and health risks. At a time in
which HIV epidemics ravage certain areas of the globe—and,
importantly, in which patented drugs have been shown to be 99 percent
effective in preventing infections among indicated populations—IP has
provided the legal infrastructure on which certain players rely. In this
sense, IP ought to be regarded as a determinant of the present status
quo (and short-to-medium-term outlook) of the current HIV epidemic

43. See I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: HOW EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTING IS EXTENDING MONOPOLIES AND DRIVING UP DRUG PRICES 2 (2018).
44. See, e.g., Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299
(2015); Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals —
Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419 (2011).
45. See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents,
Drug Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129 (2019).
46. See Hernandez, Good, Cutler, Gellad, Parekh & Shrank, supra note 41.
47. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
48. See Thomas J. Bollyky, What Past Trade Deals Reveal About Drug Pricing,
FOREIGN AFFS. (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-10-28/whatpast-trade-deals-reveal-about-drug-pricing [https://perma.cc/2SQZ-F85J] (archived Feb.
12, 2021).
49. Amy Kapczynski, Bhaven N. Sampat & Ken Shadlen, Trade Agreements,
Patents, and Drug Prices: Continuing the Debate, (Yale L. & Econ. Research Paper No.
572, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933574 [https://perma.cc/72NM-YNKG] (archived
Jan, 21, 2021) (further documenting several flaws in the Bollyky study).
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in the United States, on par with other determinants of health that are
specific to this area, such as income or geography.
If it is true that the socioeconomic determinants of health reflect
a concern with entrenched inequality and allocative imbalances, then
another link between determinants of health and IP—particularly as
implemented in the wake of the TRIPs Agreement—is the fact that the
crystallization of a maximalist ethos in national and transnational IP
regimes has profound distributional consequences. While exploring the
multiple linkages between the evolution of IP regimes and equality,
Margaret Chon has noted that not only are equality themes often
absent from IP discourse, but the opposite is true as well.50 The
approach proposed in this Article—considering IP as a core contributor
to health outcomes and risks on par with other determinants of
health—seeks to connect IP-induced, distributional imbalances to
discourses centered on health (in)equality.
Having sketched a possible relationship between the fields of IP
and determinants of health, Part II turns to specific illustrations of the
impact of IP regimes on health outcomes and risks through case
studies on different forms of technology. As a note, the examples
conveyed by the case studies are neither exhaustive within a certain
domain of biotechnology, nor are these domains the only ones in which
an interaction between IP and socioeconomic determinants of health
can be discerned. Other possibilities include epidemiological or
genomic data models (which may be hampered by the existence of
proprietary rights over databases, for example)51 or the development
of green technologies (which rely significantly on IP-based incentives
frameworks).52
Although the case studies in this Part cover different
embodiments of biotechnologies used in innovations that have or may
have an impact on the health of significant population groups, the point
is not about the exceptionalism of biotechnology within IP, but rather
about how several types of technology—in areas in which innovation
has become primarily IP-driven—are being made available in ways
that exclude, or may limit access to, swaths of indicated populations.
One of the enabling factors for this exclusion is IP, through choices that
are made at the beginning of, or during, the research and development
(R&D) processes. The case studies thus seek to illustrate the impact of

50. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property Equality, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 259, 261 (2010).
51. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer, Across Two Worlds: Database Protection in the
United States and Europe, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INNOVATION IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 13-1 (Jonathan D. Putnam ed.,
2001); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property Issues in Genomics, 14 TRENDS
BIOTECHNOLOGY 302, 302 (1996).
52. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
CLIMATE CHANGE (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., 2016).
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these choices on populations who are priced out of some inventions and
populations who would benefit from relatively inexpensive medical
technologies, which are not developed due to a (perceived) lack of
incentives for R&D.
The case studies illustrate three different forms in which postTRIPs IP regimes can produce these effects. The first one is via
excessive pricing, in the context of access to HIV prevention drugs in
the Global North. The second is via lacking incentives frameworks, in
the Global South and Global North alike. And the third is via blocking
patents—and more precisely about informational asymmetries arising
in patent thicket situations—with primary effects on technologies
needed to support nutritional health in the Global South.
II. ILLUSTRATING THE INFLUENCE OF IP IN HEALTH RISKS AND
OUTCOMES
A. A Case Study on Pharmaceuticals: Preventing HIV Infection in the
Twenty-First Century
As shown by Jerome Reichman and Rochelle Dreyfuss,
progressive rounds of harmonization of international IP have had
detrimental effects not only on populations in the Global South, but on
populations in the Global North as well.53 The case of access to
HIV/AIDS drugs illustrates this point. While a significant portion of
the foundational literature on access to medicines focuses on examples
of these detrimental effects on countries in the Global South,54 an
emerging strand of commentary on responses to the ongoing HIV
epidemic in the North has identified problems in access to drugs and
treatments that are ultimately attributable to a malfunction in patent
regimes. This case study focuses on the response to the late-twentieth
century AIDS epidemic in the United States, which made a public
health priority of R&D on drugs that could be used in the treatment
and prevention of HIV/AIDS.55
In the early 2000s, research demonstrated that a two-drug
combo—emtricitabine and tenofovir disoproxil fumarate—which
blocks an enzyme the virus needs in order to replicate itself within a
human body, was effective in the treatment of HIV-positive patients.

53. Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 33, at 92.
54. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III & CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA
AIDS CONTROVERSY: A CASE STUDY IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2005),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3WKDX79] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
55. See generally Ronald Bayer, The Medicalization of HIV Prevention: New
Opportunities Beset by Old Challenges, 92 MILBANK Q. 434 (2014) (summarizing the
overall response to the AIDS epidemic in the United States).
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This new combo, which eventually came to the market under the brand
name Truvada, gained FDA approval in 2004 as part of a treatment
regimen for HIV infection in combination with other antiretrovirals.56
Gilead—a large pharmaceutical company headquartered in
California—sponsored the drug.57
Additional research conducted in the mid to late 2000s showed
that Truvada could also be used in the prevention of HIV infection.58
In 2012, Gilead sought and obtained FDA approval to market Truvada
for pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), making it the first commercially
available drug to be used in HIV prevention.59 Even though Gilead
started commercializing Truvada for PrEP as soon as it was licensed
by the FDA, Gilead had initially decided not to promote Truvada as a
prophylactic, fearing an association with the promotion of unsafe
sexual practices.60 Word of mouth, patient advocacy, and the eventual
endorsement of PrEP from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in 201461 led the company to shift its approach in 2016.
Since then, it has invested heavily in marketing.62
As brand recognition increased, so did the price of Truvada.63
When the drug was initially approved in 2004, without prophylactic
indications, it was priced at around $650 a month.64 In 2012—the year

56. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TRUVADA APPROVAL LETTER (2004),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2004/021752s000_Truvada_Appro
v.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5TL-AJKQ] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
57. GILEAD SCIS., https://www.gilead.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/5TKW-A62R] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
58. See Robert M. Grant et al., Preexposure Chemoprophylaxis for HIV Prevention
in Men Who Have Sex with Men, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2587, 2597 (2010); Jared M.
Baeten et al., Antiretroviral Prophylaxis for HIV Prevention in Heterosexual Men and
Women, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 407 (2012).
59. See Press Release, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC
Statement on FDA Approval of Drug for HIV Prevention (July 16, 2012),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2012/fda-approvesdrugstatement.html [https://
perma.cc/A9VV-6JKS] (archived Jan. 21, 2021); Pre-exposure Prophylaxis (PReP), U.S.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/prep/
index.html [https://perma.cc/MX99-HSRW] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
60. See Switching Course, Gilead Markets HIV Drug for Prevention, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/switching-course-gileadmarkets-hiv-drug-prevention-n690271 [https://perma.cc/5KGP-UVHT] (archived Jan.
21, 2021).
61. See Press Release, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV PrEP
Guidelines (May 14, 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2014/PrEP-Guide
lines-Press-Release.html [https://perma.cc/4273-6UUV] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
62. See Switching Course, supra note 60.
63. See Jason Rhode, PrEP Drug Priced Out of Most People’s Reach, GA. VOICE
(July 13, 2018), https://thegavoice.com/news/national/prep-drug-priced-out-of-mostpeoples-reach/ [https://perma.cc/Y8P8-EQTB] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
64. Ed Silverman, Gilead Loses Its Challenge to a Pair of U.S. Patents for an HIV
Prevention Pill, STAT (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/02/05/
gilead-hiv-patents-truvada-cdc/ (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/W9EW-AGZL]
(archived Jan. 21, 2021).
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Gilead obtained FDA approval to market Truvada for PrEP—the price
tag increased to $1,159 a month.65 In 2017, it had reached $1,500;66 in
2018, it increased again to $1,600.67 In 2019, the price was $1,750 a
month, or $21,100 a year.68 The increase in price has taken place over
a period during which the number of PrEP users in the United States
has skyrocketed. In 2012, there were 8,768 users in the United States;
by 2016, the year Gilead began promoting Truvada, the number had
climbed to 77,120.69 The combination of market expansion and price
hikes transformed the drug into a reliable best-seller for Gilead. In
2016,70 for instance, Truvada generated over $2.3 billion in the United
States market and over $3.5 billion globally.71 In 2019, domestic sales
were up to $2.6 billion.72 Since 2004, Truvada has earned Gilead over
$36 billion.73
Elsewhere in the world, generic versions of Truvada for PrEP are
available at much lower price points. In France, for instance, the price
of Truvada while on patent was around 400 euros ($467) a month;
through generic competition the drug is now available for
approximately 190 euros ($186) per month.74 These prices are still

65. Id.
66. See Michael Mezher, FDA Approves First Generic Version of Gilead’s HIV
Drug Truvada, REGUL. AFFS. PROS. SOC’Y (June 9, 2017), https://www.raps.org/
regulatory-focus™/news-articles/2017/6/fda-approves-first-generic-version-of-gilead-s-hi
v-drug-truvada [https://perma.cc/GA5C-Y6Q2] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
67. See Shefali Luthra & Anna Gorman, Rising Cost of PrEP to Prevent HIV
Infection Pushes It Out of Reach for Many, NPR (June 30, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/06/30/624045995/rising-cost-of-prep-apill-that-prevents-hiv-pushes-it-out-of-reach-for-many [https://perma.cc/MJ2T-CJND]
(archived Jan. 21, 2021) (further noting that, for a period of time, Gilead waived up to
$4,800 in out-of-pocket expenses for patients with commercial insurance plans).
68. See Mark Terry, Trump Administration Sues Gilead Over Truvada PReP for
HIV Prevention, BIOSPACE (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.biospace.com/article/trumpadministration-sues-gilead-over-hiv-drug/ [https://perma.cc/4UPP-LSTK] (archived Jan.
21, 2021).
69. See Complaint at 46, United States v. Gilead Sciences, No. 19-2103-MN (D.
Del. Nov. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint].
70. 2016 was the year prior to FDA approval of the first generic competitor to
Truvada in the United States market. See Mezher, supra note 66.
71. Press Release, Gilead Sciences, Gilead Sciences Announces Fourth Quarter
and Full Year 2016 Financial Results (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.gilead.com/news-andpress/press-room/press-releases/2017/2/gilead-sciences-announces-fourth-quarter-and-f
ull-year-2016-financial-results [https://perma.cc/V8M3-EBKL] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
72. Silverman, supra note 64.
73. See Christopher Rowland, Americans Pay $US2000 for Drug Costing Aussies
Less Than $6, FIN. REV. (May 17, 2019), https://www.afr.com/world/northamerica/americans-pay-us2000-for-drug-costing-aussies-less-than-6-20190517-p51odk
(subscription required) [https://perma.cc/54DL-4944] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
74. See EU Door Opens for Generic Version of AIDS Medicine Truvada, MED.
XPRESS (July 26, 2018), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-07-eu-door-version-aidsmedicine.html [https://perma.cc/HF8J-WNHA] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).

2021]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A DETERMINANT OF HEALTH

427

higher than elsewhere in the Global North. In Australia, for example,
PrEP currently costs around $8 a month.75
The cost of Truvada for PrEP in the United States has been
identified as one of the major factors causing indicated HIV-negative
patients not to take the drug.76 This deterrent effect is especially
problematic as current levels of HIV infection in the United States are
considered epidemic.77 Experts and public health-oriented agencies
consider PrEP an especially effective way of addressing the epidemic,
as data shows that regular use of PrEP reduces the risk of HIV by 99
percent in populations who do not use controlled substances, and at
least 74 percent in those who do.78
The consequences of price-based deterrence affect both patient
populations and regions of the United States in different ways. Today,
the geographical distribution of HIV infection is uneven across
America, with rural areas in the South and Puerto Rico being
disproportionately affected.79 According to the latest available data,
pertaining to 2017, Southern states reported 52 percent of new HIV
diagnoses, with Western states a distant second at 19 percent followed
by 16 percent in the Northeast and 13 percent in the Midwest.80
However, even though the South registers more than half of new cases,
studies mapping the use of PrEP suggest that fewer patients in this
area have access to the drug than elsewhere in the country.81
Compounding the geographical disparities, new cases of HIV
infection also affect certain populations in disproportional ways: 50
percent of all new reported infections occur among black, Latino, gay,
and transgender populations.82 Among women—who account for

75. Rowland, supra note 73.
76. Luthra & Gorman, supra note 67. Additional factors include lack of
knowledge about the drug, poor patient-physician relationships, and fear of stigma. See
id.
77. See What is ‘Ending the HIV Epidemic: A Plan for America’?, HIV.GOV
https://www.hiv.gov/federal-response/ending-the-hiv-epidemic/overview (last visited
Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K7GJ-GBUG] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
78. See Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), supra note 59.
79. See AIDSVu Map (HIV Infection), AIDSVU, https://map.aidsvu.org/map
[https://perma.cc/QHWA4-3LA5] (archived Jan. 21, 2021) (providing an interactive
account of the number of cases of HIV infection by county).
80. See HIV in the United States by Region, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/overview/geographicdistribution
.html [https://perma.cc/57AR-TXF8] (archived Jan. 21, 2021) (further reporting new HIV
diagnoses in U.S. dependent areas to account for 1%).
81. See Lenny Bernstein, This HIV Pill Saves Lives. So Why Is It So Hard to Get
in the Deep South?, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/this-hiv-pill-saves-lives-so-why-is-it-so-hard-to-get-in-the-deepsouth/2019/03/11/a221a784-354a-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html [https://perma.cc/
S9DW-MWX3] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
82. See Robert Goldstein, PrEP Prevents HIV — So Why Aren’t More People
Taking It?, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G: HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Oct. 4, 2019),
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slightly over 15 percent of total new infections—three quarters of
reported new infections occur among women of color.83 These
populations are also among the most likely to be underinsured or to
have no insurance at all.84
According to CDC estimates, the overall number of people in the
United States indicated for PrEP therapy is around 1.2 million.85
Gilead has indicated that only a fraction of this population, roughly
167 thousand people, is taking Truvada.86 This corresponds to 18.1
percent of persons with indications.87 Among patients taking PrEP,
three-quarters of prescriptions are dispensed to white gay patients in
coastal states.88
To be sure, this gap between geographical areas and populations
indicated for PrEP and actual PrEP intake cannot be attributed
exclusively to the high price tag of the drug. Factors like lack of
awareness and concerns with stigma still play a role in limiting the
intake of the drug.89 Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the
price of Truvada for PrEP remains one of the major barriers to
widespread adoption of PrEP.90 The excessive price tag is particularly
concerning at a time when the levels of HIV infection in the United
States continue at epidemic proportions. As commentators and AIDS
activists have often pointed out: “[w]e have the most effective tool for
ending the HIV epidemic, and one reason we’re unable to scale up is
because it costs so [much] unnecessarily.”91
The main driver of price inflation in the case of Truvada for PrEP
is the monopoly-esque market position conferred by patents on the
drug. Even though the relevant patents are approaching their terms,
only recently has their validity—and their instrumentalization in

https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/prep-prevents-hiv-so-why-arent-more-people-taki
ng-it-2019100417942 [https://perma.cc/GA9G-2YPU] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
83. See id.
84. See Robert H. Goldstein, Carl G. Streed & Sean R. Cahill, Being PrEPared —
Preexposure Prophylaxis and HIV Disparities, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED 1293, 1294 (2018).
85. See U.S. Ctrs. Disease Control & Prevention, Vital Signs: Status of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Testing, Viral Suppression, and HIV Preexposure Prophylaxis
— United States, 2013–2018, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/wr/mm6848e1.htm [https://perma.cc/8WRK-AW
23] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
86. Luthra & Gorman, supra note 67.
87. See U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 85.
88. See Goldstein, Streed & Cahill, supra note 84, at 1293.
89. See id.
90. See Bernstein, supra note 81; Complaint, supra note 69, at 34.
91. See Anna Gorman, Cost of PrEP Is Out of Most People's Reach, PLUS (July 9,
2018), https://www.hivplusmag.com/prevention/2018/7/09/cost-prep-out-most-peoples-re
ach [https://perma.cc/DT6Q-ZLBT] (archived Feb. 14, 2021) (alteration in original); see
also James Krellenstein, Aaron Lord & Peter Stately, Why Don’t More Americans Use
PrEP?, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/prephiv-aids-drug.html [https://perma.cc/4GYG-YCUX] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
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gouging the price of Truvada for PrEP—attracted public attention and
scrutiny.
An important part of the basic research on the drug combo that
ultimately became the PrEP regimen was done by scientists at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).92 While Gilead
obtained four patents on an emtricitabine and tenofovir combo that
would become Truvada in its nonprophylactic version,93 the CDC
obtained four patents for its research on PrEP.94 After Gilead obtained
FDA approval to market Truvada in 2004 for the treatment of HIV
infection, work done through a partnership between the CDC and
Emory University, and primarily supported by $50 million in federal
grants,95 showed that the drug combo could also be used
prophylactically. It was at this point that Gilead sponsored Truvada
for PrEP and gained market approval for this new indication from the
FDA. The patents supporting Truvada for PrEP are thus the same that
supported nonprophylactic versions of Truvada. One expires in late
2020 and the others remain throughout 2021.96
Commentators and patent experts have made the case that the
prophylactic emtricitabine-tenofovir combo is quite distinct from the
nonprophylactic one. 97 For instance, it was the CDC that discovered
and confirmed the prophylactic properties of the drug combo, as well
as the appropriate dosing.98 As such, there is a distinct possibility that
Gilead’s Truvada for PrEP may be infringing on the CDC’s patent
portfolio.99
While Gilead now holds rights in some of the active pharmaceutical ingredients
used in PrEP, one of those ingredients (emtricitabine) was, in fact, discovered
and patented by researchers at Emory University, who used federal funding for
their research. In Gileadʼs hands PrEP was used as treatment and not
prevention. It was the CDC that discovered that once-a-day oral PrEP can
prevent HIV, and it was the National Institutes of Health and the Gates

92. See Complaint, supra note 69, at 1–2.
93. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations (Truvada), FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/index.cfm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2021) [https://perma.cc/82WS-2N6Q] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
94. See id.
95. See Christopher Rowland, An HIV Treatment Cost Taxpayers Millions. The
Government Patented It. But a Pharma Giant is Making Billions, WASH. POST (Mar. 26,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pharma-giant-profits-fromhiv-treatment-funded-by-taxpayers-and-patented-by-the-government/2019/03/26/cee5af
b4-40fc-11e9-9361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html [https://perma.cc/A3L8-72EU] (archived
Jan. 22, 2021).
96. See Orange Book, supra note 93.
97. See Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, United States v. Gilead: Can
a Lawsuit Yield Better Access To PrEP?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191118.218552/full/ (noting that “the
U.S. government very rarely goes to court to enforce its patents”).
98. Complaint, supra note 69, at 25.
99. See Morten & Kapczynski, supra note 97.
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Foundation that funded the first clinical trials to prove that PrEP is safe and
effective in people.100

In line with this view, the CDC notified Gilead of its patent
applications and attempted to negotiate a licensing agreement with
Gilead in 2017 and 2018, a proposition that the company declined.101
In November 2019, the US government, through the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), sued Gilead for patent
infringement.102
At the time of the lawsuit, the HHS secretary “recognize[d]
Gilead’s role in selling Truvada” but argued that “Gilead must respect
the US patent system, the groundbreaking work by CDC researchers,
and the substantial taxpayer contributions to the development of these
drugs.”103 In the complaint, the government characterizes Gilead’s
behavior in repeatedly refusing to obtain a license as “malicious,
wanton, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, and in bad faith.”104
Gilead has made the case that the company has heavily supported
the clinical trials that resulted in FDA approval of Truvada for PrEP.
In response, the government has said “that claim is disingenuous. Its
support of early clinical trials was typically limited to only the donation
of study drugs.”105 Gilead has also suggested that the patents held by
the CDC are themselves invalid “because the use of Truvada as
prophylaxis was widely known at the time the CDC sought these
patents.”106 Nonetheless, the company initially announced that it
would not challenge the CDC’s patents “because we value our
collaborative relationship with the agency.”107 Three months later,
however, it brought an inter partes review. In February 2020, the
Patent Trial and Appeals Board at the Patent and Trademark Office
ruled that Gilead had “failed to demonstrate it was likely to win its
argument for overturning the patents held by the CDC.”108

100. See id.
101. Complaint, supra note 69, at 57–58.
102. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., United States Files Patent
Infringement Lawsuit Against Gilead Related to Truvada® and Descovy® for Preexposure Prophylaxis of HIV (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/
11/06/us-files-patent-infringement-lawsuit-against-gilead-pre-exposure-prophylaxis-hiv
.html [https://perma.cc/XEB8-XHMH] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
103. See id.
104. Complaint, supra note 69, at 69.
105. See id. at 37.
106. Statement of Daniel O’Day, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer Gilead Scis.,
Inc. Before the Comm. on Oversight & Reform U.S. H. of Reps. (May 16, 2019),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190516/109486/HHRG-116-GO00-WstateODayD-20190516.pdf [https://perma.cc/25QH-NTWV] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
107. Complaint, supra note 69, at 59.
108. Gilead v. United States., No. IPR2019–01455 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2020),
http://freepdfhosting.com/0a58c071ad.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQN7-R5MT] (archived
Jan. 22, 2020); Gilead v. United Statees., No. IPR2019–01456, (P.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2020),
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In October 2019, Gilead gained FDA approval for a newer
generation PrEP drug, Descovy.109 Descovy is also a combination of
tenofovir and emtricitabine, but it uses tenofovir alafenamide as
opposed to the version of tenofovir found in Truvada.110
While the patent dispute between HHS and Gilead is still
unfolding, it is worth noting that a direct relationship can be discerned
between the IP-enabled pricing practices adopted by the manufacturer
of Truvada for PrEP111 and the difficulties in controlling the burden of
HIV infection in the United States. The complaint explains:
Another critical barrier to increasing access to PrEP in the United States has
been the cost of Truvada®, which presently is only sold by Gilead, by virtue of
U.S. patents that purportedly cover the product. This is a major reason that
many at risk of HIV infection in the United States are not currently taking
Truvada for PrEP®. Many AIDS activists and many in the medical community
have criticized Truvada®’s price in the United States, particularly in light of
HHS’s patents, the Government’s funding of clinical research on PrEP, and the
relatively low cost at which Gilead apparently makes the product.112

And while this case study explored only one embodiment of price
gouging, the problem is systemic, affecting health outcomes and risks
among diversified populations. For instance, with regard to drugs113
used in the treatment of some of the most serious conditions—from
autoimmune diseases to oncology—price gouging of on-patent drugs
remains a constant.114

http://freepdfhosting.com/e4e6827eea.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG3Y-KGK3] (archived Jan.
22, 2021).
109. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Second Drug to
Prevent HIV Infection as Part of Ongoing Efforts to End the HIV Epidemic (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-second-drug-prev
ent-hiv-infection-part-ongoing-efforts-end-hiv-epidemic [https://perma.cc/5S9X-SKPR]
(archived Jan. 22, 2021).
110. See Silverman, supra note 64.
111. Gilead was the sole manufacturer in the HIV PrEP space until 2017, at which
point the FDA approved the first PrEP generic. See Mezher, supra note 66.
112. See Complaint, supra note 69, at 48–49.
113. These drugs, known as biologics, are structurally different from the category
to which Truvada for PrEP belongs. They are subject to separate R&D and regulatory
approval processes and tend to be exponentially more expensive than conventional
drugs. See Vaccines, Blood & Biologics, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-bloodbiologics (last visited Apr. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5UDT-JWFM] (archived Apr. 17,
2021).
114. See generally Ana Santos Rutschman, Regulatory Malfunctions in the Drug
Patent Ecosystem, 70 EMORY L.J. 347 (2020).
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B. A Case Study on Epidemic and Pandemic Preparedness: From
Ebola to COVID-19 Vaccines and Treatments
The existence of one or several patents is not the only IP feature
that influences access to pharmaceuticals or biotechnologies by
populations in need. In the case of off-patent drugs, there are several
instances of products not covered by IP that fail to attract interest from
manufacturers in the private sector. The FDA keeps a list of drugs with
expired patents and market exclusivities for which there is no
commercial interest, even though there is demand from indicated
populations.115 This type of problem relates to a different dimension of
IP, which determines what kinds of products enter the market; this one
conceptually and temporally distinguishable from pricing issues
arising in connection with the commercialization of pharmaceuticals
and biologic drugs.
Utilitarian discourses depicting patents as incentive mechanisms
for socially desirable innovation often emphasize the role of IP as a sine
qua non of R&D in traditionally underfunded areas. These discourses
tend to pay particular attention to biopharmaceutical innovation,
which is known for high R&D costs, combined with significant risk of
failure.116 Absent some form of exclusivity-conferring lead time on the
market, investors and R&D players are likely to underinvest or to
allocate their resources elsewhere.
While the prospective function of patents appears to be one of the
drivers of biopharmaceutical R&D for mainstream or blockbuster
drugs,117 scholars and commentators have found scant evidence that
the patent system truly functions as a catalyst for R&D in the case of
drugs with smaller markets—both in the case of markets of limited
size, as exemplified by R&D on orphan diseases,118 and in the case of
temporary markets, as exemplified by R&D on drugs, vaccines, and
other pharmaceutical products needed to respond to outbreaks of

115. List of Off-Patent, Off-Exclusivity Drugs Without an Approved Generic, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/media/105829/download (last visited Jan. 22, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/RE5M-AFQ4] (archived Jan. 22, 2021); see also Press Release, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New Policy
to Improve Access and Foster Price Competition for Drugs That Face Inadequate Generic
Competition (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/
statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-policy-improve-access-and-foster-pr
ice-competition [https://perma.cc/7GE9-3U4L] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
116. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 316 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003).
117. See, e.g., Why Patents Are Necessary for The Pharmaceutical Industry,
SERVIER (Sept. 10, 2014), https://servier.com/en/news/why-patents-are-necessary-forthe-pharmaceutical-industry/ [https://perma.cc/8X2H-SECU] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
118. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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infectious diseases.119 Moreover, with regard to the latter, patentdriven models are often fundamentally at odds with public health
imperatives of preparedness—the ability of health systems to
anticipate and operate proactively to develop response mechanisms to
be deployed when an outbreak (or other public health crisis) occurs.120
Preparedness frameworks emphasize the need to develop and stockpile
drugs and other pharmaceutical products needed to respond to an
outbreak. Yet, current preparedness approaches are detached—both
conceptually and in practice—from the legal ecosystem that is
supposed to function as a catalyst for biopharmaceutical R&D.121
As noted in prior work, while large-scale public health crises such
as the COVID-19 pandemic paradoxically cure market failures for the
development of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products needed to
respond to an outbreak,122 they do not address this fundamental
dissociation between IP as a system of incentives and current levels of
R&D on pandemic drugs during the pre- or inter-outbreak period—
which is exactly the period during which public health policy prescribes
robust preparedness efforts.
Consider the case of the vaccine R&D landscape prior to the 2014–
16 Ebola outbreak. The diseases caused by Ebola and other pathogens
in the same viral family (filoviridae) have been studied by scientists
across the world for decades.123 The Ebola virus, in particular, was first
identified in 1976.124 By the early 2000s, a promising vaccine candidate
had been developed in North America, first through work largely
performed and funded by the United States public sector as part of the
country’s post-9/11 bioterrorism preparedness strategy,125 and then

119. See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways
from Recent Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170, 176–77 (2020)
[hereinafter Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines] (addressing the problem
of lacking R&D in the vaccine space); Yaniv Heled, Ana Santos Rutschman & Liza
Vertinsky, The Problem with Relying on Profit-Driven Models to Produce Pandemic
Drugs, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 3–4 (2020).
120. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Emergency Preparedness:
Globalizing Risk, Localizing Threats, 320 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1743, 1743 (2018),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2712530 [https://perma.cc/96GU-J7
WY] (noting that “[e]mergency preparedness requires proactive planning and funding”).
121. See Ana Santos Rutschman, Vaccines and IP Preparedness in the Coronavirus
Outbreak, NW. U. L. REV. NOTE (May 18, 2020), https://blog.northwesternlaw.review/
?p=1414 [https://perma.cc/PUA4-VQEQ] (noting the role of intellectual property in
pandemic preparedness frameworks).
122. Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 1200, 1203–04 (2018) [hereinafter Rutschman, IP Preparedness].
123. Id. at 1218–19.
124. See What Is Ebola Virus Disease?, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/about.html [https://perma.cc/
36LR-UR35] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
125. See Ebola Vaccines, U.S. NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES
(Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/ebola-vaccines [https://
perma.cc/U7HV-CDQL] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
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through work performed and funded by the Canadian public sector.126
The Canadian government applied for a patent covering a recombinant
vaccine candidate targeting Ebola in 2003.127 It then continued R&D,
estimating that clinical trials would start around 2008, with the
vaccine being fully licensed and ready for distribution two to three
years later.128 In order to move a vaccine candidate through the later
stages of R&D (including clinical trials, regulatory review, and
manufacturing), the public sector normally collaborates with, or
licenses the relevant technology to, one or more partners in the private
sector, which has the resources and infrastructure to bring a vaccine
to market. In the case of the Ebola vaccine candidate, however, the
Canadian public sector struggled to attract potential licensees.129 An
article published in the Canadian Medical Association Journal in 2005
aptly described the ongoing situation through its title: “Wanted:
Manufacturer for Ebola and Marburg Vaccines.”130 Eventually, the
vaccine was licensed to a small American pharmaceutical company,
NewLink, which received an exclusive license to “make, use, improve,
develop and [c]ommercialize” the vaccine.131 Until the beginning of the
2014–16 Ebola outbreak, however, NewLink did not invest any
resources on testing and manufacturing the vaccine.132 As journalist
Denise Grady put it: “[The] Ebola vaccine, ready for test, sat on the
shelf.”133
Elsewhere, this author has discussed the case of this Ebola
vaccine candidate as a transactional problem with a salient IP
dimension.134 Having originally obtained control over the IP associated
with the vaccine for $205,000, NewLink did not perform any additional
R&D before a large-scale outbreak occurred. At that point, it

126. Francis A. Plummer & Steven M. Jones, The Story of Canada’s Ebola Vaccine,
189 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. E1326, E1326 (2017); Matthew Herder, Janice E. Graham &
Richard Gold, From Discovery to Delivery: Public Sector Development of the rVSVZEBOV Ebola Vaccine, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 4 (Jan. 16, 2020).
127. Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Vaccines for Viral Hemorrhagic
Fevers, Can. Patent No. WO 2004/011488 A2 (filed July 28, 2003).
128. See Denise Grady, Ebola Vaccine, Ready for Test, Sat on the Shelf, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/health/without-lucrative-marketpotential-ebola-vaccine-was-shelved-for-years.html [https://perma.cc/QR27-JGA9] (archived Feb. 15, 2021).
129. See Dan Lett, Wanted: Manufacturer for Ebola and Marburg Vaccines, 173
CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 472, 472 (2005).
130. See id.
131. Sole License Agreement for Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Vaccines
for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/publichealth/services/infectious-diseases/viral-haemorrhagic-fevers/sole-license-agreement-re
combinant-vesicular-stomatitis-virus-vaccines-viral-hemorrhagic-fevers.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2021) [https://perma.cc/J72V-A96M] (archived Jan. 22, 2021).
132. See Plummer & Jones, supra note 126.
133. Grady, supra note 128.
134. Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 122, at 1244–48.
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negotiated with a large pharmaceutical company (Merck), to which it
transferred IP rights for $30 million, with an additional milestone
payment of $20 million due at the beginning of clinical trials.135 In this
transactional sense, IP rights enable rent-seeking behaviors that are
at odds with public health goals of having vaccines—or other health
goods—come to market as soon as technically and scientifically
possible.136
There is nonetheless an additional dimension to this story, which
illustrates the shortcomings of overreliance on IP incentives as a way
to catalyze R&D and bring certain types of health goods to market.
Even when a patent has already been granted, there are cases in which
the status quo—be it in the form of patent-related or nonpatent
incentives—is simply inadequate to further preparedness and public
health goals. Against a backdrop of little to no economic return
anticipated in connection with the development of an Ebola vaccine—
compounded by the prevalence of the associated disease among
populations outside the geopolitical lines of the developed world—a
vaccine that could have been developed and potentially approved
before a large outbreak struggled to attract private-sector attention,
only to remain untouched for years once the Canadian government
succeeded in licensing it. From an incentives perspective, the primary
trigger for late-stage R&D was thus the onset of a public health crisis
in the form of the 2014–16 outbreak—the first Ebola outbreak that
resulted in the death of a patient on US soil.137
The current misalignment between IP-centric incentives and
preparedness frameworks affects some health goods more markedly
than others. The development of vaccines targeting emerging
infectious diseases138—from Ebola to coronaviruses and other

135. See id. at 1247; see also Stacy Lawrence, Merck, NewLink Nab Up to $76M
BARDA Contract to Back Ebola Vaccine, FIERCE BIOTECH (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/merck-newlink-nab-up-to-76m-barda-contract-toback-ebola-vaccine [https://perma.cc/Z956-EEWC] (archived Feb. 15, 2021).
136. The point here is not that transactability of IP rights is problematic. In fact,
as a structural feature of IP regimes, transactability can promote a more efficient
allocation of rights, as well as serve as a catalyst for collaborative R&D. In the case at
hand, however, the transfer of IP from the public sector to NewLink results in a situation
in which the new rightsholder instrumentalizes IP to magnify economic returns without
having contributed to the R&D process. See Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note
122, at 1221–22.
137. See Clarence Spigner, Patient Zero: Thomas Eric Duncan and the Ebola Crisis
in West Africa and the United States, BLACK PAST (Oct. 29, 2014),
https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/perspectives-global-african-history/pat
ient-zero-thomas-eric-duncan-and-ebola-crisis-west-africa-and-united-states/
[https://
perma.cc/GG3H-648G] (archived Jan. 20, 2021) (chronicling the story of Thomas Eric
Duncan).
138. These diseases are characterized as “[o]utbreaks of previously unknown
diseases[;] [k]nown diseases that are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range
in the last 2 decades[; or p]ersistence of infectious diseases that cannot be controlled.”
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pathogens resulting in respiratory illness—is among the areas most
affected by this misalignment. If regarded as commodifiable goods,
vaccines are generally unattractive in terms of return on
investment.139 They are preventatives, leading either to the production
of nonevents (the inexistence of an outbreak) or the mitigation of the
effects of the disease (the occurrence of a smaller outbreak, or the
production of less severe consequences to public and individual
health);140 they offer scarce possibilities of repeated consumption;141 as
biological products, they require costly and specialized manufacturing
and distribution chains;142 and, in the case of vaccines targeting
emerging infectious diseases, indicated populations have traditionally
been largely confined to economically disadvantaged areas of the
world, further dimming revenue prospects.143
This dissociation between public health value and market-driven
incentives to biopharmaceutical R&D is not restricted to vaccines. As
the COVID-19 pandemic started to unfold, scientists began exploring
hundreds of different potential treatments.144 A significant number of
treatment candidates consisted of repurposed drugs—drugs already in

See Emerging Infectious Diseases, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine
.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/emerging-infectious-diseases [https://perma.cc/4U
79-TMVX] (archived Jan. 20, 2021).
139. See generally Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines, supra note
119.
140. But see Rino Rappuoli, Henry I. Miller & Stanley Falkow, The Intangible
Value of Vaccination, 297 SCI. MAG. 937, 937 (2002) (expressing uncertainty about the
viability of vaccines as a preventative strategy); Meghan L. Stack, Sachiko Ozawa, David
M. Bishai, Andrew Mirelman, Yvonne Tam, Louis Niessen, Damain G. Walker & Orin
S. Levine, Estimated Economic Benefits During The ‘Decade of Vaccines’ Include
Treatment Savings, Gains in Labor Productivity, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 1021, 1026–27 (2011)
(collectively noting economic gains attributable to widespread vaccination of indicated
populations).
141. See, e.g., Recommendations for Routine Immunizations, WHO
https://www.who.int/immunization/policy/Immunization_routine_table1.pdf?ua [https://
perma.cc/W82H-4MLL] (last updated Sept. 2020) (listing recommended doses for the
most commonly administered vaccines across the world); see also Patricia M. Danzon,
Nuno Sousa Pereira & Sapna S. Tejwani, Vaccine Supply: A Cross-National Perspective,
24 HEALTH AFFS. 706, 712–14 (2005) (citing the shortages and demand uncertainty
regarding manufacturers’ production of vaccines).
142. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., TRAINING FOR MID-LEVEL MANAGERS (MLM),
MODULE 1: COLD CHAIN, VACCINES AND SAFE-INJECTION EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT 32–
38 (2008), https://www.who.int/immunization/documents/MLM_module1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WE8V-RAVX] (archived Jan. 20, 2021).
143. See Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 122, at 1211 (noting that “[t]he
economic footprint of the regions where outbreaks occurred in the past have been too
small to trigger strong private-sector R&D investment, while interest from other players
has been overshadowed by more visible neglected diseases like malaria or HIV/AIDS.”).
144. As of September 18, 2020, there were 339 treatment candidates for COVID19 being tested across the world. COVID-19 Treatment and Vaccine Tracker, MILKEN
INST., https://covid-19tracker.milkeninstitute.org/#treatment_antibodies (last updated
Jan. 19, 2021, 10:15 PM) [https://perma.cc/PY98-EBB5] (archived Jan. 20, 2021).
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use (or being studied) for a different indication.145 Among these, the
antiviral remdesivir146 emerged early on as one of the leading
candidates;147 in May 2020, it became the first COVID-19 treatment
temporarily authorized by the FDA for the treatment of hospitalized
patients.148 In August, Gilead—the pharmaceutical company
sponsoring remdesivir—submitted a new drug application to the FDA
seeking full approval of the drug.149
While the quick timeline under which remdesivir was developed
and tested as a treatment for COVID-19 is remarkable, it also points
to a misalignment between preparedness standards and current R&D
models leaning heavily on IP and market forces.150 Remdesivir was
originally developed through contributions from both the US public
sector (through research performed at government institutions, such
as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, as
well as grants to academic research institutions) and scientists at
Gilead.151 During the 2014–16 Ebola outbreak, remdesivir was tested
on animals and, after showing promise, progressed to phase one
clinical trials.152 Nevertheless, as the outbreak began to unwind, so did

145. See generally Sudeep Pushpakom Francesco Iorio, Patrick A. Eyers, K. Jane
Escott, Shirley Hopper, Andrew Wells, Andrew Doig, Tim Guilliams, Joanna Latimer,
Christine McNamee, Alan Norris, Philippe Sanseau, David Cavalla & Munir
Pirmohamed, Drug Repurposing: Progress, Challenges and Recommendations, 18
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 41 (2019).
146. See Katherine Seley-Radtke, Remdesivir Explained — What Makes This Drug
Work
Against
Viruses?,
CONVERSATION
(May
6,
2020,
8:20
AM),
https://theconversation.com/remdesivir-explained-what-makes-this-drug-work-againstviruses-137751 [https://perma.cc/VDJ6-FFJH] (archived Jan. 20, 2021) (outlining basic
information about remdesivir).
147. John H. Beigel et al., Remdesivir for the Treatment of Covid-19 – Final Report,
383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1813, 1814 (Nov. 5, 2020).
148. Gilead’s Investigational Antiviral Remdesivir Receives U.S. Food and Drug
Administration Emergency Use Authorization for the Treatment of COVID-19, GILEAD
(May 1, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-room/press-releases/2020/
5/gileads-investigational-antiviral-remdesivir-receives-us-food-and-drug-administratio
n-emergency-use-authorization-for-the-treatment-of-covid19 [https://perma.cc/39B7-VS
5U] (archived Jan. 20, 2021).
149. See Gilead Submits New Drug Application to U.S. Food and Drug
Administration for Veklury® (Remdesivir) for the Treatment of COVID-19, GILEAD (Aug.
10, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-room/press-releases/2020/8/
gilead-submits-new-drug-application-to-us-food-and-drug-administration-for-veklury-re
mdesivir-for-the-treatment-of-covid19 [https://perma.cc/CR7N-MSGX] (archived Jan.
20, 2021).
150. See Heled, Rutschman & Vertinsky, supra note 119, at 17–22.
151. See Silverman, supra note 64.
152. GILEAD, DEVELOPMENT OF REMDESIVIR 1 (2020), https://www.gilead.com//media/gilead-corporate/files/pdfs/covid-19/gilead_rdv-development-fact-sheet-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WEV4-D3WK] (archived Jan. 20, 2021); see also Ned Pagliarulo, A
Closer Look at the Ebola Drug That’s Become the Top Hope for a Coronavirus Treatment,
BIOPHARMA DIVE (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/coronavirusremdesivir-gilead-antiviral-drug-covid-19/573261/ [https://perma.cc/UNA3-T9YS] (archived Jan. 20, 2021).
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R&D on remdesivir, even though its antiviral potential was already
well understood.153 Gilead made R&D on remdesivir a priority as soon
as the magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic became apparent.154 As
the company awaits approval from the FDA to broadly market
remdesivir, it has announced that a full five-day course of treatment—
which costs $10 per dose to manufacture155—will cost $3,120 to
Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers in the United States.156
Other developed countries will be able to buy the drug at a 25 percent
discount.157 The company also announced that developing countries
would pay “significantly less” for remdesivir, without providing further
details on specific numbers.158
Thus, while preexisting R&D turned remdesivir into a leading
candidate for the treatment of emerging diseases, it was a severe public
health crisis that effectively nudged R&D actors to see its development
through the R&D pipeline. Once again, this is at odds with public
health principles of epidemic and pandemic preparedness, which
prioritize investment in, and the development of, health goods before a
public health crisis occurs.
This misalignment is not solely attributable to IP frameworks.
Yet, it illustrates how contemporary constructions of IP as systems of
incentives to innovate fit poorly with goals of epidemic and pandemic
preparedness. In the case of remdesivir, Gilead first applied for a
patent in the United States in 2015.159 The patent was issued in
2019.160 The prospect of imminent patent-induced market exclusivity
was not enough to prioritize pre-pandemic R&D on remdesivir, though.
The repercussions of this dissociation are not insignificant. Once
studied in connection with Ebola, remdesivir was repurposed to treat
a respiratory disease. While this repurposing appears to constitute a
positive development from a scientific perspective, it is matched by a
lack of continued R&D in connection with viruses in the Ebola family,
as well as corresponding opportunity costs. Since the 2014–16

153. See Seley-Radtke, supra note 146 (noting that remdesivir belongs to “oldest
and most important classes of drugs”).
154. GILEAD, supra note 152, at 2.
155. Rohan Chalasani & Walid Gellad, The US Is Paying Way Too Much for
Remdesivir, WIRED (July 17, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-is-paying-waytoo-much-for-remdesivir/ [https://perma.cc/Y5ZN-FBNK] (archived Jan. 20, 2021).
156. See, e.g., Sarah Hansen, Gilead Finally Reveals Remdesivir Pricing After
Weeks of Speculation, FORBES (June 29, 2020, 9:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
sarahhansen/2020/06/29/gilead-finally-reveals-remdesivir-pricing-after-weeks-of-specul
ation/#6e14859a405b [https://perma.cc/5UEV-7ZD2] (Jan. 20, 2021). A five-day course of
remdesivir will cost $2,340 to the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Indian Health
Service. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Silverman, supra note 64.
160. Methods for Treating Arenaviridae and Coronaviridae Virus Infections, U.S.
Patent No. 10,251,904B2 (issued Apr. 9, 2019).
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outbreak, there have been several Ebola outbreaks in Africa.161 An
outbreak in 2018, affecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
(to a lesser extent) Uganda, registered 3,470 reported cases and a
fatality rate of 66 percent.162 A 2020 outbreak in the same country
resulted in 130 reported cases and a fatality rate of 42.3 percent. The
latest Ebola outbreak, also affecting Democratic Republic of the Congo,
started in February 2021 and is ongoing at the time of writing.163
Merck’s Ebola vaccine, known as Erverbo, was finally approved in
December 2019, three years after the 2014–16 outbreak, seventeen
years since a patent application was initially filed, and around fifteen
years since the Canadian government started looking for a
manufacturer.164 As Ebola continues to affect primarily populations in
economically depressed areas of the globe, the misalignment between
incentives systems and public health needs is most taxing on some of
the most vulnerable populations. The World Health Organization’s
Regional Office for Africa has surveyed different types of socioeconomic
determinants of health and their impact on health outcomes across the
African continent.165 IP—be it its pricing facet or its incentive
function—is not part of this analysis, or of standard literature on the
determinants of health. Yet, as the case of pandemic and epidemic
vaccines and drugs illustrates, IP and IP-adjacent decisions and
priorities routinely inform levels of public health preparedness across
the developing world—by directly influencing the types of health
technologies available to prevent and respond to outbreaks of
infectious diseases, and ultimately bearing an imprint in individual
and systemic public health outcomes.
At a different level, the case of remdesivir marries incentive
problems with pricing issues somewhat similar to the ones described
in Part II.A. From the early stages of the coronavirus outbreak
onwards, studies have repeatedly shown that COVID-19 has placed a
disproportionately heightened health, social, and economic burden on
racial minorities and economically disadvantaged populations in the

161. 40 Years of Ebola Virus Disease Around the World, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html
[https://perma.cc/3J8B-W9JW] (archived Jan. 20, 2021).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See First FDA-Approved Vaccine for the Prevention of Ebola Virus Disease,
Marking a Critical Milestone in Public Health Preparedness and Response, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 19, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/
first-fda-approved-vaccine-prevention-ebola-virus-disease-marking-critical-milestone-p
ublic-health [https://perma.cc/C7HX-BXML] (archived Jan. 20, 2021).
165. See Social and Economic Determinants of Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
REGIONAL OFFICE FOR AFRICA, https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/social-andeconomic-determinants-health [https://perma.cc/3AHV-AW4Q] (Jan. 20, 2021).
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United States.166 The current price point for remdesivir is likely to
further underscore these disparities, which are precisely the type of
problem(s) that interventions based on determinants of health
frameworks seek to correct. For these reasons—as well as the ones
developed in connection with the next case study—Part III will further
make the case for considering IP, and in particular the patent system,
as a determinant of health.
C. A Case Study on AgTech: Genetically Modified Crops
The final case study focuses on an example outside the field of
pharmaceuticals and vaccines. This case concerns genetically modified
rice, which was developed in response to nutritional deficiencies among
populations in certain areas of the developing world. Vitamin A
deficiency, in particular, is one of the leading causes of malnutritionrelated morbidity and mortality across the Global South.167 Every
year, an estimated 1 million children die from causes related to vitamin
A deficiency, while an additional 350 thousand lose their sight.168 In
line with other efforts to address this pressing public health problem,
in the 1990s, scientists at European research institutions took the first
steps towards the genetic modification of a species of rice (Oryza
sativa), adding beta-carotene, which the human body transforms into
vitamin A.169 This type of enriched rice became known as “Golden Rice”
due to its yellowish color, and was hailed as an invention that could
potentially benefit countless people, and in particular children, in lowincome economies, where rice has long been the most-consumed
crop.170
In order to modify Oryza sativa, scientists incorporated two genes
from daffodils and one bacterium into the rice species.171 Because
scientists involved in the project had relied on preexisting technology,
they were concerned about the IP landscape surrounding Golden Rice,

166. See, e.g., Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Groups, CDC
(July 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/
race-ethnicity.html#fn2 [https://perma.cc/R9L2-YT4H] (archived May 12, 2021).
167. Robert E. Black, Lindsay H. Allen, Zulfiqar A. Bhutta, Laura E. Caulfield,
Mercedes de Onis, Majid Ezzati, Colin Mathers & Juan Rivera, Maternal and Child
Undernutrition: Global and Regional Exposures and Health Consequences, 371 LANCET
243, 243 (2008).
168. J. Madeleine Nash, This Rice Could Save a Million Kids a Year, TIME (July
31, 2000), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,997586,00.html [https://
perma.cc/57GY-A336] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
169. See Xudong Ye, Salium Al-Babili, Andreas Klöti, Jing Zhang, Paola Lucca,
Peter Beyer & Ingo Potrykus, Engineering the Provitamin A (β-Carotene) Biosynthetic
Pathway into (Carotenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm, 287 SCI. MAG. 303, 303 (2000).
170. Nash, supra note 168.
171. The Golden Rice Technology, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRIBIOTECH
APPLICATIONS,
https://www.isaaa.org/kc/inforesources/biotechcrops/The_
Golden_Rice_Technology.htm [https://perma.cc/6QLT-XPP7] (Jan. 21, 2021).
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as well as with the prospect of having to negotiate multiple licensing
agreements with different rightsholders.172 A study conducted in 2000
by the International Service for the Acquisition of Agribiotech
Applications (ISAAA), an American nonprofit tech transfer company,
identified a minimum of seventy patents “that could have implications
for the commercialization” of Golden Rice.173 At that point, Golden Rice
research had been funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Swiss
Government, and the EU.174 Funding from the EU required the
participation of a private sector company.175 A large British
agrochemical and biotech company, Zeneca—later AstraZeneca and
today, Syngenta—thus joined the project as a research partner.
Importantly, the company had an exclusive license over one of the
genes that scientists had used to develop Golden Rice.176
Against the backdrop of potentially costly and protracted IP
negotiations, the scientists who had invented Golden Rice—and who
were interested in making it available to the world’s poorest
populations—turned to a German startup company, Greenovations, to
broker the IP negotiations.177 The result of the negotiations was twofold: AstraZeneca obtained an exclusive license to commercialize
Golden Rice in the Global North, as well as to “medium and large-scale
farmers” in the Global South.178 The company then granted back to the
scientists the right to sublicense Golden Rice in the South at no cost.179
Additionally, the company pledged “to give regulatory, advisory, and
research assistance” to bring Golden Rice to developing economies.180
On its face, the creation of two separate streams to diffuse the
innovation, one commercial and the other “humanitarian” (as it
became known),181 appears to further the interest of populations in
need while balancing incentives frameworks as currently entrenched
in global IP-centric industries.

172. Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps: A Case Study in the Public Sector’s
Mismanagement of Intellectual Property, RAFI COMUNIQUE, Sept./Oct. 2010, at 1, 2–3
[hereinafter Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps].
173. See id. at 3.
174. See Nash, supra note 168.
175. Peter Beyer, Salim Al-Babili, Xudong Ye, Paola Lucca, Patrick Schaub, Ralf
Welsch & Ingo Potrykus, Golden Rice: Introducing the β-Carotene Biosynthesis Pathway
into Rice Endosperm by Genetic Engineering to Defeat Vitamin A Deficiency, 132 J.
NUTRITION 506S, 509S (2002).
176. Nash, supra note 168.
177. Beyer, Al-Babili, Ye, Lucca, Schaub, Welsch & Potrykus, supra note 175, at
509S.
178. See Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, supra note 172, at 3 (“medium and
large-scale farmers” were defined as those who sold more than $10,000 of Golden Rice).
179. See Beyer, Al-Babili, Ye, Lucca, Schaub, Welsch & Potrykus, supra note 175,
at 509S–10S.
180. Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, supra note 172, at 1.
181. Beyer, Al-Babili, Ye, Lucca, Schaub, Welsch & Potrykus, supra note 175, at
509S.
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Nevertheless, a closer look at the information supporting the
finding of a patent thicket in ISAAA’s survey reveals a different IP
landscape. The decision to grant an exclusive license to a large agtech
company rested, according to one of the inventors of Golden Rice,182 on
the understanding shared by scientists and funders alike that diffusion
of the invention—even through the humanitarian stream—faced a
“severe intellectual property rights problem.”183 The problem was
characterized by the inventor as insurmountable but for the
collaboration with AstraZeneca, which held one of the blocking
patents.184 In late 2000, however, a study by the Rural Advancement
Foundation International (RAFI) showed that ISAAA’s pre-licensure
survey vastly overstated the number of patents at stake.185 Instead of
a minimum of seventy and up to 105 patents, as identified by ISAAA,
RAFI’s study showed that there were only eleven relevant patents at a
maximum.186 Part of the reason for the overcalculation had to do with
the fact that several of the patents in ISAAA’s calculations had actually
been accounted for twice based on (or under the guise of) different
numbers issued by the US and the European patent offices.187 When
corrected for duplicate entries, the number came down to forty-four.188
Moreover, the ISAAA survey expressly made the point that IP
rights would likely prevent distribution of Golden Rice across most of
the South, even if the inventors made them available for free. It
provided that “widespread release of the current version of
GoldenRice™ will require significant licensing activity if it is to
legitimately become available to the world, either commercially or for
humanitarian purposes.”189
The post-licensure study again showed that not to be the case.190
In over 50 percent of the countries with serious levels of vitamin A
deficiency (thirty-five out of sixty), there were no patents covering any
of the technology involved in Golden Rice.191 In the remaining
countries, only twelve patents were found to be potentially relevant.192
At the same time, among the dozen countries with populations with

182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, supra note 172, at 3.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 4.
188. See id.
189. David R. Kryder, Stanley P. Kowalski & Anatole F. Krattiger, The Intellectual
and Technical Property Components of Pro-Vitamin A Rice (GoldenRice™): A
Preliminary Freedom-to-Operate Review, 20 ISAAA BRIEFS i, vii (2000).
190. See Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, supra note 172, at 4.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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vitamin A deficiency who “consume rice in sufficient quantity to make
them potential targets,” half had no relevant patents.193
It should be pointed out that, as a genetically modified food
product, Golden Rice has been met with concern and criticism by
several commentators, activists, and organizations. Some of the issues
that have been raised are health focused and relate to the larger
question of the impact of genetically modified crops on human
health.194 Others are ecological and relate to the effects and
sustainability of the shift in farming practices introduced by Golden
Rice and similar genetically engineered products.195 Others still speak
to ongoing debates on the stringency—or lack thereof—of current
regulatory regimes for biotechnology.196
While Golden Rice has not been approved for commercialization
in affluent countries, regulatory agencies in the Global North
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) have
evaluated Golden Rice at the request of the International Rice
Research Institute,197 a large intergovernmental research institute
based in the Philippines.198 All four regulatory agencies declared to
have “no further questions” about the safety of Golden Rice.199 In
December 2019, the Department of Agriculture in the Philippines
approved Golden Rice for use as food, feed, and for processing,200 and
a similar regulatory approval process is currently underway in
Bangladesh.201
This is not to opine on the merits of Golden Rice in itself, a topic
completely outside the scope of this Article. A large portion of the story
of this product of modern agtech is steeped in complex scientific, social,
and policy queries. Likewise, from a legal perspective, the history of
Golden Rice also threads into a more complex universe of domestic and

193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Dan Charles, In A Grain of Golden Rice, A World Of Controversy
Over
GMO
Foods,
NPR
(Mar.
7,
2013),
https://www.npr.org/sections/
thesalt/2013/03/07/173611461/in-a-grain-of-golden-rice-a-world-of-controversy-over-gm
o-foods [https://perma.cc/58PX-MWJE] (archived Jan. 13, 2021).
195. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 168.
196. See, e.g., id.
197. See e.g., Brian Owens, Golden Rice is Safe to Eat, Says FDA, 36 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 559, 559 (2018).
198. INT’L RICE RSCH. INST., https://www.irri.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/B8TP-4UWH] (archived Jan. 13, 2021).
199. Owens, supra note 197, at 559.
200. Katherine J. Wu, Golden Rice Approved as Safe for Consumption in the
Philippines, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
smart-news/golden-rice-approved-safe-consumption-philippines-180973897/ [https://pe
rma.cc/T6US-82R2] (archived Jan. 13, 2021).
201. Philippines Approves Golden Rice for Direct Use as Food and Feed, or for
Processing, INT’L RICE RSCH. INST. (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.irri.org/news-andevents/news/philippines-approves-golden-rice-direct-use-food-and-feed-or-processing [ht
tps://perma.cc/MT7R-834G] (archived Jan. 13, 2021).
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transnational regulatory choices affecting food regimes. But there is a
core component of the Golden Rice case that illuminates ongoing
challenges at the intersection of IP and public health: a product of
biotechnology, and more specifically of agtech, which may have an
impact on nutrition levels across several of the most impoverished
areas of the Global South, is covered by a plurality of patents that
exacerbate informational asymmetries between inventors and holders
of patent rights covering ancillary technologies.202
It is also worth noting that Golden Rice—as was the case with the
technologies surveyed in the previous Parts—does not constitute an
isolated case in the field of biotechnology. Other examples of
genetically modified foods developed in patent-dense environments
include ferritin-enriched lettuce in Japan,203 disease-resistant papayas
in Hawaii,204 and disease-resistant dwarf wheat in India.205
III. TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE IP DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
A. The Existing IP Framework
As seen in Part I, the fields of the determinants of health and of
IP have largely operated as separate doctrinal categories, even though
there are multiple ways in which patent laws and norms directly affect
health outcomes and risk in countries in the Global South and North
alike.
Arguably, a balanced implementation of the TRIPs Agreement
could have helped curb some of the rights-maximizing behaviors that
have repeatedly resulted in price gouging and the exclusion of
populations in need of critical inventions protected by patents. Article
7 subjects both the protection and the enforcement of IP rights to “the
mutual advantage of producers and users” of protected goods, a
“balance of rights and obligations,” and the larger principle of the
promotion of “social and economic welfare.”206 This balancing approach
is further complemented by Article 8, which establishes that countries

202. See infra Part III.A.
203. See generally IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURE ON HUMAN HEALTH AND NUTRITION
138–54 (Ismail Cakmak & Ross M. Welch eds., 2009).
204. See generally Michael Goldman, The IP Management of the PRSV-Resistant
Papayas Developed by Cornell University and the University of Hawaii and
Commercialized in Hawaii, in IP HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1837 (2007),
http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch17/p27/ [https://perma.cc/DJC8-HYPE] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
205. See generally David Biello, Norman Borlaug: Wheat Breeder Who Averted
Famine with a “Green Revolution,” SCI. AM. (Sept. 14, 2009), https://blogs.scientific
american.com/news-blog/norman-borlaug-wheat-breeder-who-av-2009-09-14/ [https://
perma.cc/452S-QS68] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
206. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 24, art. 7.
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may adopt additional measures “to prevent the abuse of intellectual
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology,” as long as these measures are consistent with
the letter and the spirit of the TRIPs Agreement.207
Even though TRIPs provides the theoretical foundation to address
some of the current imbalances in the diffusion of health-related
innovations,208 many scholars have observed that implementation
processes have often veered away from balancing tenets.209 This trend
is underscored by the adoption of maximalist approaches in bilateral
and plurilateral trade agreements.210
Exploring the ways in which there may be meaningful links
between IP laws and frameworks for determinants of health entails
making the case that TRIPs Article 7 should become central to current
and future applications of international and domestic IP laws, both at
the legislative and interpretive levels. The connection between
(purportedly) innovation-promoting regimes and the dissemination of
health-related goods is given enhanced attention in TRIPs. In fact,
Article 8 expressly forecasts the need to give the areas of “public
health” and “nutrition” a particularized treatment at the national
level: “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition . . . provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement.”211 The provision further extends the
possibility of the adoption of additional measures to cases in which
countries may need “to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socioeconomic and technological development.”212
While vastly underused, Article 8 does provide enabling language that
could support the establishment of national regimes that leave much
less room for behaviors like price gouging by explicitly incorporating a

207. Id. art. 8.2.
208. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement,
46 HOUS. L. REV. 979 (2009).
209. See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 121–62 (2003); GRAEME B.
DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE
RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 49–143 (Oxford
U. Press 2012); Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 441–44
(2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 1–9 (2004);
Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 33.
210. See generally Okediji, supra note 25; Mercurio, supra note 25; Annette Kur &
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough Is Enough — The Notion of Binding Ceilings in
International Intellectual Property Protection (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop.,
Competition & Tax L., Research Paper Series No. 09-01, 2009).
211. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 24, art. 8.1.
212. See id.

446

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 54:413

balancing mechanism—such as a fair-pricing requirement, which
could cap the increase of the price of pharmaceuticals, for example.
The TRIPs carve out for public health and nutrition was developed
by the Doha Declaration,213 which states:
[T]he TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.214

Compulsory licensing is a particular type of TRIPs-compatible
intervention, which some countries in the Global South have taken
advantage of in the field of pharmaceuticals.215 Under TRIPs, thirtyone domestic patent laws can allow for the “authorization by the
government to itself or to a third party to use the patent without the
permission of the patent holder.”216 The Doha Declaration
(Declaration) both clarified and expanded the cases in which national
governments may issue compulsory licenses.217 Importantly, the
Declaration specifically addressed the public health toll posed by
epidemics, “including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis [and]
malaria,” and made it clear that countries have the freedom to
determine “what constitutes a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency” for the purposes of issuing a
compulsory license on a drug needed to address an epidemic or other
form of public health crisis.218 A first wave of countries that resorted
to compulsory licensing in the context of infectious disease outbreaks

213. See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under
the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 921 (2007); Abbott, supra note
30.
214. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), para. 4 [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
215. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 24, art. 31 (laying out the procedural and
substantive frameworks for compulsory licensing).
216. Battling HIV/AIDS: A Decision-Maker’s Guide to the Procurement of
Medicines and Related Supplies (2004), in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 195, 195 (Y. Tayler ed., 2007).
217. See Doha Declaration, supra note 214, para. 5(b)–(c).
218. See id. para. 5(c).
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included Thailand219 and Brazil,220 both in connection with the
HIV/AIDS drug Efavirenz.
TRIPs, as informed by Doha, thus expresses a particular concern
with the abuses or insufficiencies of IP regimes that may have a direct
impact on health-related issues. Further, it provides countries with the
ability to incorporate tools to respond to these problems in their
domestic laws. As documented in IP scholarship, and as illustrated by
the case study on HIV-prevention drugs in the United States, these
tools have only been used in limited circumstances. For instance, while
holding great potential, compulsory licensing has been sparse across
the Global South, and driven primarily by the larger economies of the
South.221
Furthermore, even though TRIPs contribute to the legal
framework that individual countries can use to address the overmaximization of patent rights resulting in price gouging and exclusion
of populations indicated for a drug, there is little enabling power in the
Agreement to address issues related to other aspects of IP—namely
problems surrounding incentives for drugs regarded as having limited
markets. The case study in Part II addressed the case of vaccines for
infectious diseases, but drugs targeting neglected tropical diseases222
or orphan diseases223 face similar incentives problems. Similarly,
TRIPs-based solutions can do little to address the types of
informational asymmetries in bargaining that are common in practice,
as seen in the case of Golden Rice.

219. Thailand Issues Compulsory Licence For Patented AIDS Drug, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV (Dec. 13, 2006), https://www.ictsd.org/bridgesnews/bridges/news/thailand-issues-compulsory-licence-for-patented-aids-drug. See generally Holger P. Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and
Access to Medicines, in 7 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 584 (2007) (describing other instances
of compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals—or threat thereof—in the Global South).
220. Brazil Issues Compulsory Licence For Aids Drug, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (May 8, 2007), https://ictsd.iisd.org/brazil-issues-compulsory-licencefor-aids-drug [https://perma.cc/2XTD-7UN4 ] (archived Feb. 15, 2021).
221. A recent development that bolstered the compulsory licensing framework for
pharmaceuticals—and which gives countries in the Global South additional tools to
address public health crises—was a 2017 amendment to TRIPs, which codified the
possibility of compulsory licenses being issued for the export of pharmaceuticals,
replacing a temporary waiver under paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. See TRIPs
Agreement, supra note 24, art. 31; see also William New, It’s Official: TRIPS Health
Amendment in Effect, First Ever to A WTO Agreement, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/01/23/official-trips-health-amendment-effect-firstever-wto-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/9CG9-4962] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
222. Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/8NYC-NYSV] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
223. Orphan Products: Hope for People with Rare Diseases, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/orphan-products-hopepeople-rare-diseases (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/FU42-S9N7] (archived
Jan. 21, 2021).
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The following subpart suggests that viewing IP as a determinant
of health might be useful to locate additional fixes for ongoing problems
rooted in patent regimes that detrimentally affect health outcomes and
health risks.
B. Complementing the Toolkit of Determinants of Health Through IP
Interventions informed by determinants of health frameworks
may indirectly address some disfunctions originating in patent
regimes. However, they are limited in scope and are unlikely to
address, let alone remove, the cause of the IP-related phenomenon that
aggravates negative health outcomes and increases health risks.
Consider the case of HIV-prevention drugs discussed in Part II.A. An
intervention affecting one or more determinants—namely, income or
education levels—might mitigate the problem for individual patients
and thus produce effects on an ad hoc basis, but it is unlikely to provide
any mechanisms that can be used in the short term to prevent systemic
infection. Moreover, these interventions cannot eliminate the root of
excessive pricing practices, which in itself represents a malfunction of
a legal regime.
In this subpart, the Article turns to possible pathways to mitigate
the impact of IP-enabled behaviors that detrimentally affect health
outcomes and health risks. The first one is aimed at problems that
currently allow for either excessive pricing of health-related goods,
such as price gouging of HIV prevention drugs, or uncertainties
surrounding the IP status of ancillary technologies needed to develop
products capable of lessening malnutrition or other ailments through
nonclinical interventions (such as the case of cloudy information and
bargaining asymmetries in the licensure of Golden Rice): it shows how
existing legal mechanisms—liability rules—can be tailored to offset
some of the problems surveyed in Part II. The second pathway focuses
on an emerging solution to the incentives side of the problem:
transnational partnerships that have emerged in the health space
(such as the case of scarcely incentivized R&D on vaccines). These are
not meant to be a complete treatment of the areas surveyed, but rather
an indication of possible pathways that can be pursued under a view
that certain components of IP regimes produce effects that can
determine—and often do determine—the production of undesirable
health outcomes, or the accentuation of health risks among vulnerable
populations.
More broadly, the Article notes that recognizing the role of IP as
a determinant of health also sheds light on the need for a greater crosspollination between traditional, institutional IP, and non-IP actors,
particularly at the international level.
Certain embodiments of IP—dysfunctional ones, but in any case,
actual ones—have contributed to the creation of patent regimes in
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which the grant of proprietary rights may be instrumentally used to
restrict access to pharmaceutical or biotech products that can be used
to improve health outcomes and reduce health risks. One of those
instrumental uses of IP results in the excessive pricing of
pharmaceuticals, as illustrated by the example of Truvada for PrEP in
the context of an HIV epidemic. Another constitutes a byproduct of the
creation of patent thickets around health-related technologies, as seen
in the case of Golden Rice. These behaviors increase transaction costs,
obscure informational signals, and accentuate bargaining imbalances
between rights holders and follow-on innovators.
The most direct fix for these types of problems is located at the
national level through legislative or governmental interventions, or
both. In Europe, for instance, there are price controls in place that
impede some of the extreme gouging that occurs with regard to
pharmaceuticals in the United States.224 International IP law, through
compulsory licensing regimes as outlined above, provides governments
with an operational framework to address problems related to the
scarcity of health-related goods on the supply side.
These types of interventions, however, are often fraught with
practical and political economy constraints. In the United States, for
instance, pre-TRIPs (and TRIPs-compatible) legislation, like the BayhDole Act,225 gives the government the ability to “march-in” on patents
held by entities in the private sector covering publicly funded
inventions.226 Funding agencies retain the ability to force the licensure
of inventions to third parties in certain situations, including instances
in which forced licensure is needed to “alleviate health or safety needs
which are not reasonably satisfied” by the way the rightsholder is
practicing the invention.227 In practice, however, no “march-in”
petitions have ever been granted in the United States, even though
they have been brought in connection with pharmaceutical drugs.228

224. See, e.g., Austin Frakt, To Reduce the Cost of Drugs, Look to Europe, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/upshot/to-reduce-the-costof-drugs-look-to-europe.html [https://perma.cc/5B94-2KLC] (archived Jan. 21, 2021);
David Gross, Jonathan Ratner, James Perez, Sarah L. Glavin, International
Pharmaceutical Spending Controls: France, Germany, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom,15 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 127, 127 (1994).
225. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200 et seq., Pub. L. No. 96–517, 94 Stat. 3015
(1980).
226. See 35 U.S.C. § 203.
227. See 35 U.S.C. § 203(b); see also, Christopher Rowland, A Rare Deterrent to
Limitless Drug Price Increases May Die Under Trump, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/4XHY-GGX6 (quoting the academic view that “[t]he idea that the price
is too high fits pretty comfortably in the wording of the statute”).
228. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, OFF. OF THE DIR., DETERMINATION IN THE
CASE OF PETITION OF CELLPRO, INC., https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/policy/cellpro-marchin.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WKJ-UEB8] (archived Jan. 15,
2021) (denying a march-in petition of a stem cell separation device based on § 203(a)(2)
public health grounds).
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While legal frameworks enabling the government-administered
licensure of patents (under certain circumstances and subject to
certain criteria) exist in domestic IP regimes in the North and South—
namely in the form of compulsory licensing—they have proved
underused thus far, with the exception of a few countries in the
South.229
An alternative to the ex post intervention of governments through
compulsory licensing is the ex ante establishment of liability regimes
for certain types of patentable innovation—in the case at hand, in the
form of a tailored liability regime focused on health-related areas that
would allow for the forced licensure of technology needed when public
health crises occur.
Elsewhere, this author has explored the possibility of liability
regimes in connection with patentable vaccine technology.230 This
framework may also be useful to mimic the effects of compulsory
licensing in cases in which this mechanism, even though lawfully
applicable, is not available for political economy or other reasons.
Liability rules enable a second comer to use someone else’s entitlement
without consent and against the payment of an “objectively determined
value.”231 This approach is in sharp contrast with proprietary modes of
innovation, in which one or more patents shield the invention from
unauthorized uses by second comers.232
Consider how these two regimes would operate differently in cases
in which second comers have the ability to manufacture follow-on

229. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 24, art. 31(b); see also Christopher J.
Morten & Charles Duan, Who’s Afraid of Section 1498? A Case for Government Patent
Use in Pandemics and Other National Crises, 23 YALE J.L. TECH. 1 (2020); Ryan Whalen,
The Bayh-Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: Will the Agencies
Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2015) (collectively exploring
mechanisms beyond compulsory licensing). See generally Jerome H. Reichman,
Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options,
37 J. MED. ETHICS 247 (2009); Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing of Patents During
Pandemics (Jan. 6, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
230. Ana Santos Rutschman, Property and Intellectual Property in Vaccine
Markets, 5 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 1 (2020) [hereinafter Rutschman, Property in Vaccine
Markets]; Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the Twenty-First Century, 61
ARIZ. L. REV. 729 (2019) [hereinafter Rutschman, The Vaccine Race].
231. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
401–13 (David Kennedy and William W. Fisher III eds., 2007); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV.
713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 601 (2001); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997);
Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Patents: One
Experimental View of the Cathedral, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 138 (2011). See generally
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
232. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 231.
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versions of prophylactic or preventative drugs and vaccines: under
property rules, a follow-on innovator wishing to commercialize a
cheaper version of such a drug or vaccine would need not only to obtain
permission from the patentee(s), but also to support the transaction
costs associated with the bargaining and licensure processes. If the
patentee refused to negotiate, as it is currently allowed to, the followon innovator would not be able to make, use, or distribute the
technology (or perform protected processes) for the duration of the
relevant patent(s). By contrast, under a liability model, the same
innovator would not have to wait for permission to commercialize a
competing product. Rather, the second comer would “take and pay” for
the technology irrespective of the will of the patentee, who would
nonetheless be monetarily compensated by a third-party use of the
technology.233
This example should not be understood as a suggestion that all
types of socially valuable innovation—or even innovation in the
pharmaceutical and agtech fields—should be subjected to liability
frameworks. Rather, as in previous writings,234 this Article argues that
it is possible to utilize existing legal constructs in narrowly tailored
ways to address especially acute cases of transactional inefficiencies
known to contribute to an increase in health risks or poor health
outcomes for especially vulnerable populations. This author has
argued in the past that a closed-list, narrowly-defined liability regime
covering some components needed to develop vaccines against
emerging pathogens would warrant consideration by policymakers and
lawmakers,235 especially as patent holders generally do not expect a
meaningful return on investment in this area.236 Conversely, a liability

233. See Jack M. Balkin & Ian Ayres, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 704 (1996).
234. See Rutschman, The Vaccine Race, supra note 230, at 762–70. See generally
Rutschman, Property in Vaccine Markets, supra note 230.
235. Rutschman, The Vaccine Race, supra note 230, at 767. But see id. at 768–69
(acknowledging the drawbacks of this proposal, including the likely need for legislative
intervention to establish such a liability regime, however tailored). For an example of a
different type of tailored liability regime proposed by legal scholars, consider, for
instance, the work of Jerome Reichman and Tracey Lewis, who have proposed a liability
regime focused on traditional knowledge and specifically designed to encourage smallscale innovation in developing countries. See Jerome H. Reichman & Tracey Lewis,
Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application
to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337, 354–65
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
236. See, e.g., COAL. FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS (CEPI),
PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN 2017-2021 12 (2016), https://cepi.net/wp-content/
uploads/2019/02/CEPI-Preliminary-Business-Plan-061216_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR
E7-D88S] (archived Feb. 24, 2021) [hereinafter CEPI PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN]
(noting that “it is anticipated that vaccines developed with CEPI support will not be
profitable”).
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regime covering next-generation vaccine technology—such as the case
of mRNA vaccines, which were made available for the first time during
the COVID-19 pandemic237—would be ill-advised. This is an area in
which the R&D landscape is much more populated, well-funded, and
programmatically different from the lacking R&D pipeline that unites
the case studies presented in Part II.
Beyond these particular illustrations, the broader point here is
that there are legal solutions that would be less taxing on the political
economy than some of the IP mechanisms considered (but seldom used)
to address large public health crises, such as compulsory licensing to
march-in rights.238
From an international IP perspective, narrowly tailored liability
regimes targeting a specific and limited set of health goods or
technologies would be compatible with the TRIPs precept that patents
should be granted across fields of technology.239 A liability approach,
especially if implemented surgically, does not do away with the
metaphoric bundle of rights conferred by the grant of a patent. Rather,
it limits the ability of the rights holder to refuse to license in exchange
for a compensatory payment—which should offset some of the
economic losses potentially endured by the rightsholder—in areas in
which market-driven business models render return-on-investment
difficult or, in some cases, virtually impossible.240
From a public health perspective, tailored liability regimes have
the potential to make follow-on innovation less cumbersome (from a
transactional perspective) and less costly in areas in which the
development and production of critical health goods is traditionally
underincentivized. As such, they constitute an example of an IP
intervention that is closely aligned with the goals of corrective
interventions informed by determinants of health frameworks. For
instance, given the heightened importance of active ingredients in
drugs needed to prevent HIV infections (or components of engineered
crops or foods), a narrowly construed liability regime could be created
for these critical components in cases of significant public health need.
If created, a liability regime could be instrumental in attracting followon innovators (in the form of generic competitors) during epidemics of
infectious diseases like HIV, or to boost competition for interventions
targeting malnutrition in rural areas or the Global South. Similarly, a
liability regime can instill competition in markets in which, through a

237. See, e.g., Lisa A. Jackson et al., An mRNA Vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 —
Preliminary Report, NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1920, 1921 (Jul. 14, 2020),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmoa2022483
[https://perma.cc/2JCR-EQ49]
(archived Feb. 15, 2021).
238. Supra Part III.A; see also Kumar, supra note 229.
239. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 24, art. 27.1 (establishing patent protection
for meritorious inventions in “in all fields of technology”).
240. See Rutschman, The Vaccine Race, supra note 230, at 752–54.
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combination of IP and non-IP determinants of health, certain
populations have limited or no access to life-changing or life-saving
drugs.
In this sense, and although liability regimes are often discussed
as mechanisms designed to further economic efficiency by reducing
transaction costs,241 they also promote distributive justice242—which
is one of the main goals of interventions based on determinants of
health frameworks—as they facilitate the development of, and access
to, critical health technologies that are needed to improve health
outcomes and reduce health risks.
The proposal sketched above focuses on an intervention aimed
primarily at addressing transactional issues related to IP and enabling
follow-on innovation, particularly in areas where lack of affordable
goods or technologies is bound to result in detrimental effects to health
risks and outcomes. Liability regimes, however, cannot guarantee that
a certain drug or food technology will be produced in the first place. A
different type of solution is needed to respond to problems arising in
situations of insufficient incentives to R&D provided (at least partly)
by IP regimes. In response to this need, the creation of large-scale
public-private partnerships has recently emerged as a form of
transnational self-organization designed to counter lacking incentives
regimes in biopharmaceutical R&D.243
As seen in Part II, drugs and vaccines needed to both prevent and
respond to public health crises—from infectious diseases now largely
concentrated in economically disadvantaged areas like HIV to events
felt at a global scale like COVID-19—are among the most routinely
underfunded tools in public health preparedness. Until the early
2000s, there were very few multilateral responses to problems posed
by the misalignment between IP incentives frameworks and R&D on
underfunded diseases.244
One of the earliest attempts to address the lacking incentives
framework for traditionally underfunded diseases resulted in the
formation of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi) in

241. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 231, at 1093; Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 231, at 718.
242. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 231, at 1110.
243. See generally THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Margaret
Chon, Pedro Roffe & Ahmed Abdel-Latif eds., 2018); JON F. MERZ, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2005); Roy
Widdus, Public-private Partnerships for Health: Their Main Targets, Their Diversity,
and Their Future Directions, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 713 (2001), https://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/268389/PMC2566486.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y [https://perma.cc/4KLB-BQQL] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
244. See MERZ, supra note 243, at 17.
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2003.245 DNDi is a nonprofit R&D organization focused on the
development of “urgently needed treatments for neglected patients” at
“affordable” prices.246 The diseases the organization targets are largely
prevalent in, although not exclusive to, the Global South, including
sleeping sickness, Chagas disease, cutaneous and visceral
leishmaniasis, hepatitis C, river blindness, mycetoma, and pediatric
HIV.247
From 2003 to 2023, DNDi operates with funding from the public
(57 percent) and private (43 percent) sectors.248 Public donors include
governments and public-sector institutions from countries in Europe
(including the European Union), Asia, America, and Australia, as well
as nonprofit organizations like Unitaid and The Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.249 Among the governmental funders,
there are several emerging economies of the Global South, including
Brazil, Colombia, and Thailand.250 And in contrast with recent trends
in international cooperation, the United States remains a funder to
DNDi through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID).251
Private funding is provided through heterogenous donor types.
These include different branches of Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors
without Borders), several foundations (including the Bill & Melinda
Gates, the Stavros Niarchos, and the Rockefeller Foundations in the
United States, the Carlos Slim Foundation in Mexico and the Medicor
Foundation in Liechtenstein), the Japanese pharmaceutical Takeda,
the Wellcome Trust in the United States, private companies operating
outside the health arena (including Goldman, Sachs & Co.), as well as
named individuals and anonymous individual and foundation
donors.252
DNDi likens its role to that of “a conductor of a ‘virtual orchestra’
of over 180 partners around the world to develop treatments for
patients—not profits . . . [b]y bringing together the public, private,

245. See DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://dndi.org/ (last
visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E7CT-E3VR] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
246. Id.
247. See
Diseases,
DRUGS
FOR
NEGLECTED
DISEASES
INITIATIVE,
https://dndi.org/diseases/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/L22Y-E5MS]
(archived Jan. 16, 2021).
248. See Our Donors, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE,
https://dndi.org/about/donors/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/TK9M-4QTK]
(archived Jan. 16, 2021).
249. See Our Donors: Public Donors, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE,
https://dndi.org/about/public-donors/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9XR59DYX] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See Our Donors: Private Donors, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES
INITIATIVE, https://dndi.org/about/private-donors/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/28EH-F3SS] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
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academic, non-profit, and philanthropic sectors.”253 By supporting and
coordinating R&D specifically targeted to traditionally underfunded
diseases and underserved populations, DNDi was one of the earliest
public-private partnerships operating in the pharmaceutical R&D
space.254 Between the early 2000s and the late 2010s, dozens of publicprivate
partnerships
dedicated
to
pharmaceutical
or
biopharmaceutical R&D were launched every year.255 Some took a
more general-purpose approach to innovative R&D. For instance, the
Innovative Medicines Initiative,256 to date the largest public-private
partnership in the life sciences operates in twelve strategic areas,
ranging
from
antimicrobial
resistance
to
cardiovascular,
neurodegenerative, psychiatric, and respiratory diseases.257 Others, by
contrast, chose to focus in a single area, as is the case of the Combating
Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARBX), which funds “antibacterial research to tackle the global rising
threat of drug-resistant bacteria.”258 Yet others are more oriented
towards the development of a specific type or types of health
technologies. A recent and already salient example is the case of the
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), a publicprivate partnership launched in the wake of the 2014–16 Ebola
outbreak as a direct response to the longstanding and widely
acknowledged underinvestment in R&D on vaccines, particularly in
the field of emerging infectious diseases.259 Launched in 2017, CEPI
was designed as a “gap” filler, funding and coordinating the
development of new vaccines for diseases classified by the World
Health Organization as emerging and in need of “priority” R&D.260
Less than three years later, as the COVID-19 pandemic began to

253. See How We Work, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE,
https://dndi.org/about/how-we-work/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HV4BZLB3] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
254. See MERZ, supra note 243, at 17.
255. See id.; see also Mark D. Lim, Comment, Consortium Sandbox: Building and
Sharing Resources, 6 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 2 (2014).
256. See About IMI, INNOVATIVE MEDICINES INITIATIVE, https://www.imi.europa
.eu/about-imi (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ND2T-WDY5] (archived Jan.
16, 2021).
257. See Strategic Research Agenda, INNOVATIVE MEDICINES INITIATIVE,
https://www.imi.europa.eu/about-imi/strategic-research-agenda (last visited Jan. 16,
2021) [https://perma.cc/7CED-MA9C] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
258. See About, CARB-X, https://carb-x.org/about/overview/ (last visited Jan. 16,
2021) [https://perma.cc/M2GY-FKTE] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
259. See Why We Exist, CEPI, https://cepi.net/about/whyweexist/ (last visited Jan.
16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V9AT-RSAF] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
260. CEPI PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 236, at 10–11; see also
Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines, supra note 119, at 182.
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unfold, CEPI was among the earliest and most significant funders of
R&D on COVID-19 vaccines.261
All of the organizations mentioned above operate predominantly
as (co)funders and coordinators of R&D efforts among a plurality of
transnational entities. They are known in the literature as “product
development” public-private partnerships. These partnerships differ
from “access partnerships,” which typically place large advance orders
of goods (either fully developed or undergoing development, as is
presently the case with COVID-19 vaccines262) as a way to nudge the
development and manufacturing of products that can then be
distributed at relatively affordable prices.263
One the earliest examples of a health-oriented public-private
partnership was Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which was established in
Switzerland in 2000 and quickly became the coordinator of the largest
procurement mechanism for childhood vaccines needed in the Global
South.264 Gavi is now involved in the procurement of vaccines targeting
COVID-19 through the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility
(COVAX), a partnership created in summer 2020 to address the twin
problems of manufacturing and allocation of vaccines at the global
level.265 Through COVAX, Gavi has placed orders with different
pharmaceutical companies before for vaccines that have yet to be
approved by the competent regulatory authorities at the domestic level
(such as the European Medicines Agency or the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration).266 These advance commitments allow for at-risk
manufacturing of vaccines, paving the way for the quickest distribution
possible of the first batches of vaccine—provided that such distribution
is cleared by regulatory authorities.267
Critically, the combination of product development and access
partnerships illustrates the interdependence of incentives regimes,

261. CEPI to Fund Three Programmes to Develop Vaccines Against the Novel
Coronavirus, nCoV-2019, CEPI (Jan. 23, 2020), https://cepi.net/news_cepi/cepi-to-fundthree-programmes-to-develop-vaccines-against-the-novel-coronavirus-ncov-2019/ [https
://perma.cc/5526-2J7K/] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
262. See, e.g., Helen Branswell, WHO, Partners Unveil Ambitious Plan to Deliver
2 Billion Doses of Covid-19 Vaccine to High-Risk Populations, STAT (June 26, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/26/who-partners-unveil-ambitious-plan-to-deliver-2billion-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine-to-high-risk-populations/ [https://perma.cc/U9YM-GJ
YU] (archived Jan. 15, 2021) (describing the formation of the public-private partnership
COVAX).
263. See generally MERZ, supra note 243, at 2–4 (describing the differences
between product development and access partnerships).
264. See About Our Alliance, GAVI, https://www.gavi.org/our-alliance/about (last
visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/34YE-5TBW] (archived Jan. 16, 2021).
265. See COVAX Explained, GAVI, https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covaxexplained (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/L92S-9VML] (archived Jan. 16,
2021).
266. See id.
267. See id.
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R&D processes, and the political economy. Addressing the problems
posed by the ongoing underfunding of certain diseases (or types of
health technologies) is bound to require a multiplicity of interventions,
involving heterogenous players across geopolitical borders. Insofar as
some of these problems are umbilically connected to IP dynamics,
many non-IP players have played an integral role in transnational
collaborations aimed at improving current R&D frameworks and
enhancing access to health goods by populations in need. Conversely,
IP players, norms, and policies have shaped the living conditions,
health risks, and health outcomes of populations across the globe—
especially in economically depressed or otherwise underserved areas of
both the South and the North.
A holistic understanding of IP as a determinant of health will thus
likely translate into the recognition that it is necessary to amplify IP
debates in public health arenas and other non-IP venues, and to
further recognize the role of transnational non-IP public health actors
in interventions that have the potential to mitigate some of the
imbalances introduced (or accentuated) by overly proprietary IP
regimes. At the same time, actors moved by determinants of health
frameworks would likely benefit from becoming more IP-literate and
increasing their interaction with traditional IP players (such as the
World Intellectual Property Organization or offices offering technical
assistant in the field of IP at the domestic level), as well as with players
in indirect IP fora—from the World Health Organization268 to publicprivate partnerships operating in pharmaceutical R&D or other fields
related to public health.
IV. CONCLUSION
If IP is the default regime to incentivize innovation—including
that in pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, and agricultural
industries—then the ways in which these types of innovation are
produced, distributed, or made available may have an impact on
nonclinical factors that directly influence health risks and outcomes.
This Article has provided an overview of how certain embodiments of
post-TRIPs IP have come to have such an influence, primarily in ways
that exclude or limit the access of certain populations to critical health
goods. The Article has further posited that IP can and should be
regarded as a determinant of health proper. This understanding would
enable lawmakers and policymakers, as well as activists in non-IP
domains, to consider additional solutions when seeking to remedy
structural inequities affecting health risks and outcomes.

268. See Laura Pedraza-Fariña, The Intellectual Property Turn in Global Health,
36 OSIRIS (forthcoming 2021) (draft on file with author).

